Remuneration Report

1. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Executive Board

A. Main Features of the Remuneration Policy and Contribution Toward Promoting the Corporate Strategy and Long-Term Development of the Company

The remuneration policy for the Executive Board aims to remunerate the members of the Executive Board appropriately in line with their tasks and responsibilities and to directly consider the performance of each member of the Executive Board and the success of the company. Accordingly, the remuneration policy includes fixed remuneration components as well as short- and long-term variable remuneration components.

The company strategy is aimed at achieving profitable growth and a sustained, long-term increase in the value of the company. This strategy is the basis from which the structure of the remuneration policy is derived for the Executive Board of Sartorius AG: The short-term variable remuneration depends on annual corporate targets that are aligned with key performance indicators for profitable growth of the company. Long-term remuneration depends on a corporate goal that reflects the sustainable and long-term growth of the company and the Group, on the one hand, and on the long-term performance of the share price, which directly reflects the development of the company's value, on the other. As a result, the company's remuneration policy creates incentives to promote the long-term and positive sustainable development of the company.

B. Details of the Remuneration Policy

I. Remuneration Components

1. Overview of the Individual Remuneration Components

Remuneration consists of fixed and variable components. The fixed components are the fixed annual salary and fringe benefits. The variable performance-based components are comprised of short-term components with a one-year assessment basis and of long-term components with a multi-year assessment basis. In addition, there are pension commitments, which depend, among other things, on the amount of the own contribution made by the respective Executive Board member in the form of deferred compensation for variable remuneration components, and which are therefore also variable.

2. Fixed Remuneration Components

a) Fixed Annual Remuneration

Fixed annual remuneration is cash compensation related to a specific fiscal year, and is based in particular on the area of duties and responsibilities of the respective Executive Board member. This fixed annual remuneration is paid in twelve monthly installments.

b) Fringe Benefits

Beyond the remuneration components stated above, the members of the Executive Board receive the following fringe benefits: each member is entitled to use a company car that can also be used for private purposes and to be covered by accident insurance taken out in the respective Executive Board member's name as a beneficiary. Moreover, for Executive Board members residing outside Germany, Rainer Lehmann und John Gerard Mackay, the costs for taking flights home, running two households and costs associated herewith are also paid by the company as fringe benefits.

The D&O insurance policy concluded for Executive Board members as beneficiaries is not recognized as salary expenses and therefore is not of a remunerative nature.

3. Variable Performance-Based Remuneration Components

a) Short-Term Variable Remuneration with a One-Year Assessment Basis

Short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis consists of three individual components related to the subordinate financial targets of sales revenue | order intake, underlying EBITDA and the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA.

These subordinate financial targets are essential control elements for profitable growth as well as for a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company and thus serve to implement the company's overall strategic objectives. There are no non-financial target parameters.

For each of these three individual components, a separate individual target amount is set for each Executive Board member. This target amount is used as the basis to determine the specific amount to be paid out according to the particular target achievement of the relevant subordinate target for the fiscal year in question. The targets are weighted differently for the individual Executive Board members according to their area of responsibility and thus relate to different measurement parameters in part (Group or Group and respective division).

Annual short-term variable remuneration is calculated for a fiscal year ended and paid in the following fiscal year. The amount paid out for each subordinate target is capped at a maximum of 120% of the individual target amount.

The subordinate targets within the short-term variable remuneration are weighted for the Executive Board members as follows:

Subordinate Target	Executive Board Chairman | Chief Financial Officer	Executive Board Members with Division Responsibility
Related to the Sartorius Group		
Average calculated from sales revenue | order intake	30%	9%
Underlying EBITDA	40%	12%
Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA	30%	9%
Related to the particular division		
Average calculated from sales revenue | order intake	--	30%
Underlying EBITDA	--	40%

Subordinate Target "Average Calculated from Sales Revenue | Order Intake"

The subordinate target "average calculated from sales revenue | order intake" is a key performance indicator of growth and is equal to the amount in euros that the Supervisory Board annually de-fines as part of the budget for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 90% of the amount defined in the budget, and this amount is capped at 104%. If 90% of the amount defined in the respective budget is achieved, 50% of the associated individual target sum will be paid out; if the target is achieved at less than 90%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. If 104% of the amount defined in the budget is achieved, an amount equal to 120% of the corresponding individual target amount will be paid out; if the target is achieved in excess of this percentage, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Intermediate values are interpolated linearly. Target achievement is measured on the basis of actual sales and order intake in constant currencies, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for the amounts contributed by businesses acquired or divested during the respective reporting year to the extent that such businesses are not part of

the budget. Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

Subordinate Target "Underlying EBITDA"
The subordinate target "underlying EBITDA" is a key profitability indicator of the Group. This indicator is used to provide a picture of the Group's operating development that is also internationally better comparable. Underlying EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and adjusted for extraordinary items. It is equal to the amount in euros that the Supervisory Board annually defines as part of the budget for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 70% of the amount defined in the budget, and this amount is capped at 120%. The level of the bonus payment is linear to the level of target achievement; i.e., if 70% of the subordinate target is achieved, 70% of the related individual target amount will be paid out, or if 120% of the target is achieved, 120% of the related individual target amount will be paid out. If the target is achieved at less than 70%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. By contrast, if the target is achieved by 120% or more, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual underlying EBITDA figure, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as by taking into account current exchange rates and adjusting for non-operating expenses and income (e.g., restructurings, divestitures, etc.). Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

Subordinate Target "Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA"
The subordinate target "ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA" is a key financial ratio regarding the Group's debt financing capacity. This ratio is calculated as the quotient of net debt and under-lying EBITDA and corresponds to the percentage that the Supervisory Board annually defines as part of the budget for the Group or division, respectively. The level of the bonus paid is between 50% and 120% of the respective subordinate target amount. If the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA reaches the ratio defined in the budget, the bonus level to be paid is 100%. If this ratio is above that defined in the budget, the bonus level will decrease proportionately down to 50% if the maximum amount defined by the Supervisory Board for the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA is reached. If the ratio exceeds this maximum amount, no bonus will be paid for this subordinate target. By contrast, if net debt to underlying EBITDA is below the value defined in the respective budget, the bonus amount is capped at 120%, with the associated ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA derived mathematically on a linear proportional basis from the maximum and target values for this ratio as defined by the Supervisory Board. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA in constant currencies, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for inflows and outflows entailed by strategic (capital) measures, such as acquisitions, provided that such inflows and outflows are not included in the budget. Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

b) Long-Term Variable Remuneration Components
The long-term variable remuneration components for all Executive Board members first consist of the following two individual components: One individual component is related to the development of the consolidated net profit in a three-year assessment period as a target parameter; the other, to the price development of Sartorius AG preference shares in an assessment period of (at least) four years. As a result, the long-term variable remuneration components are also aligned with financial target parameters that measure profitable growth and a sustainable and long-term in-crease in the value of the company, and thus serve to implement the company's overarching strategic objectives. Non-financial target parameters are not provided for the long-term variable remuneration components either.

The two previously mentioned long-term variable remuneration components are each weighted at 50%. For each of both individual components, a separate individual target amount is defined for every Executive Board

member. This target is used as the basis for calculating the specific bonus amount to be paid out based on the degree of achievement of the associated targets defined for the respective fiscal years.

The Executive Board Chairman Dr. Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based compensation as a further long-term variable remuneration component.

The respective long-term variable remuneration components together generally represent the majority of the variable compensation components for each Executive Board member. Deviations from this arrangement apply only temporarily to Executive Board members René Fáber and John Gerard Mackay for the period up to the end of their current appointment and employment contracts until end of 2021.

Consolidated Net Profit

The individual component related to consolidated net profit has an assessment period of three consecutive fiscal years and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche concerned is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The amount paid out for a particular tranche depends on the total target achievement for the respective assessment period, which corresponds to the average target achievement for each of the three fiscal years of the relevant assessment period. For each fiscal year, the Supervisory Board annually defines a target for consolidated net profit in euros. To determine the level of target achievement for a fiscal year, the consolidated net profit after non-controlling interest, excluding amortization (impairment of the value of intangible assets due to business combinations pursuant to IFRS 3) – as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved – is compared to the particular target set by the Supervisory Board. In individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amount to allow for non-recurring, unusual items and/or non-operating items.

This remuneration component is generally paid out upon expiration of the third fiscal year in the respective period of assessment for the tranche concerned. The level of the bonus paid can be be-tween 0% and 120% and increases linearly up to the level of total target achievement, where the minimum amount set by the Supervisory Board for consolidated net profit must at least be exceeded. If this minimum amount is merely reached or goes below the individual subordinate target set, no bonus will be paid. If 120% of the total target is achieved, 120% of the related individual target amount will be paid out. Intermediate values are interpolated linearly. By contrast, if target achievement exceeds 120%, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out as it is capped at this percentage.

However, to smooth the amounts to be paid out, a partial payment amounting to 50% of the target achievement for the first fiscal year of each respective average period of assessment for a tranche will be effected based on the individual subordinate target. Such a partial amount will be calculated and paid out at the end of the first fiscal year of a respective assessment period based on the company’s consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved. Any overpayments as a result of these partial payments will be offset against other remuneration components once the total target achievement has been determined after the third fiscal year of an average assessment period.

Development of the Preference Share Price (Phantom Stock Plan)

Executive Board members receive virtual shares, so-called phantom stock units, as a second individual component of long-term variable remuneration. Through the issue of such shadow shares, Executive Board members are treated as if they were owners of a certain number of preference shares in Sartorius AG, without, however, being entitled to receive dividends. The development of the value of this phantom stock is linked with the development of the Sartorius preference share; both increases and decreases in the share price are taken into account. Later, the value of this phantom stock is assessed based on the share price at the time, and its equivalent is paid out in cash, provided that the associated conditions are met. Phantom stock cannot be traded and does not entail any share subscription rights.

According to the Sartorius phantom stock plan, each Executive Board member is credited at the beginning of every year with phantom stock units valued at an agreed monetary sum. The value of this phantom stock can be paid out only as an entire annual tranche. Payment can be requested at the earliest after a period of four years and no later than after eight years.

An Executive Board member is entitled to receive payment for phantom stock units only if the share price at the time of such payment request has appreciated at least 7.5% per year relative to the time the phantom stock was assigned or if the share price outperformed the TecDAX as a comparative index. In addition, the value of the phantom shares must be at least 50% of the grant value. The phantom stock plan rules out subsequent changes to the parameters used for comparative stock valuation.

The amount to be paid is capped at a maximum of 2.5 times the share price at the time the phan-tom stock was assigned, based in each case on the individual annual tranche.

Assignment of this phantom stock and later payment of its monetary equivalent depend on the mean value calculated from the average prices of the Sartorius AG preference share, with said prices quoted in the closing auction of Xetra trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the last 20 days of trading of the previous year or over the last 20 days of trading prior to submission of a payment request. This serves to compensate for any short-term fluctuations in the share prices.

Payment for phantom stock is blocked for the four weeks preceding the scheduled publication date of quarterly results and for the 30 calendar days before the scheduled publication of the half-year results and preliminary year-end results, as well as for 20 days of trading on the stock ex-change following the actual publication of quarterly and preliminary year-end results. These black-out periods are intended to ensure that payments are only made during periods in which the most recent business results have already been processed in the capital market and the regular publication of further business results is still sufficiently far in the future.

Share-Based Payment

In December 2019, the Executive Board Chairman Dr. Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based payment in connection with the fourth extension of his appointment as a member and Chairman of the Executive Board as well as CEO. This was in the form of company shares with a grant date fair value totaling €5.0 million (based on the share price as of December 5, 2019, as the grant date); this corresponds to a proportional grant date fair value of €1.0 million for each year of his new five-year term of appointment. For this purpose, a corresponding number of treasury shares (27,570 own shares in total), consisting of equal parts of own preference shares and own ordinary shares, were transferred to Dr. Kreuzburg at the beginning of his new term in November 2020. The shares granted shall be subject to a holding period that will end on November 10, 2024. Should Dr. Kreuzburg leave the company prior to November 11, 2022, at his own request, his entitlements to be granted said shares by transfer shall lapse in their entirety. If Dr. Kreuzburg leaves the company after November 10, 2022, and before November 11, 2024, at his own request, half of his entitlements to be granted said shares shall lapse. For the purpose of the target total remuneration, the shares granted for Dr. Kreuzburg's current five-year term of appointment are recognized at their pro-rated grant date fair value for each year of his term of appointment.

4. Pension Commitments

The members of the Executive Board generally receive pension commitments as defined-benefit plans for their first reappointment. At the request of the Executive Board member concerned, the company will take out an insurance policy for the term of his employment contract and pay the particular benefit contributions into this insurance. Each benefit contribution consists of a basic amount between 10% and 14% (as of 2022 the same rate of 14% for all Executive Board members) of the particular member’s annual fixed remuneration. On request, the particular Executive Board member concerned can additionally pay in, as a personal benefit contribution by way of deferred compensation, a partial sum of between 5% and 7% maximum (as of 2022 the

same rate of 7% for all Executive Board members) out of the gross amount paid to this Executive Board member in the respective fiscal year as short-term variable compensation and as long-term variable compensation based on net profit. If a member of the Executive Board exercises this right, the company on its part will make an additional contribution in the same amount (matching benefit contribution). In divergence from this arrangement, Executive Board member John Gerard Mac-kay receives a basic amount of 9.5% of the sum of his annual fixed remuneration[1] and the target amount of his annual variable remuneration; accordingly, the option for deferred compensation and matching benefit contribution does not apply to him. For the purpose of deter-mining the target total compensation and the relative share of the pension commitments in a member's target total remuneration, only the basic amount to be paid by the company and the matching benefit contribution were taken into account (based on 100% target achievement of the relevant variable remuneration components).

Pursuant to the insurance terms and conditions, the pension benefit can be granted in the form of a retirement pension or a lump-sum payment for reaching the regular retirement age or needing to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of surviving dependents' benefits for widows and orphans, according to which particular option an Executive Board member elects. The company does not guarantee the paid-in capital or an annual interest rate.

Furthermore, an earlier pension agreement granted to Dr. Kreuzburg provides that he will receive a monthly pension dependent on the basic salary of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz") in the respective version applicable. With each full year of service on the Executive Board, 5% of his full pension will be vested until his fully vested pension will have been reached after 20 years. In this case, these retirement benefits will be fully vested, taking his years of service on the Executive Board into account, at the end of December 31, 2021. His retirement benefits will be granted in the form of a pension in the cases where he reaches the regular retirement age or needs to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of a pension for widows and orphans and shall correspond to 70% of the monthly pension benefits of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz"). These additional pension commitments are considered in the determination of Dr. Kreuzburg's target total remuneration and of the relative proportion of his pension commitments in his target total remuneration along with the respective employee benefit expense attributable thereto.

The regular retirement age for all pension commitments is 65. There are no early retirement regulations, except in the case of disability.

5. Other Remuneration Components

The remuneration policy provides that the Supervisory Board may grant special compensation at its reasonable discretion for extraordinary performance by a member of the Executive Board.

II. Target Total Remuneration; Relative Percentages of Fixed and Variable Remuneration Components

The Supervisory Board determines a specific target total remuneration for each Executive Board member. The target total remuneration is the sum of all remuneration components relevant for total remuneration. For the variable components, the target amount is taken as a basis in each case of 100% target achievement, provided that a target is measured. In the case of share-based compensation, which is granted as an additional variable remuneration component only to the Executive Board Chairman, the pro-rated grant date fair value (= €1.0 million annually) is recognized for each year of the Chairman's associated contract term to ensure transparent and traceable reporting for the purposes of target total remuneration. Regarding pension

1 Reduced by a supplementary amount for fixed remuneration, which was originally agreed as an allowance for a company car (so-called car allowance)

commitments, it is further assumed that the Executive Board members will exercise their right to receive deferred compensation of their variable remuneration components (based on 100% achievement of targets) to the maximum extent permitted and that the company will therefore also pay each member a corresponding additional amount as a matching contribution.

For the Executive Board Chairman, the relative percentage of fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is around 29% and the percentage of the variable remuneration components on the whole around 64% of his target total remuneration. The percentage of the short-term (target) compensation of his target total remuneration is around 17%; that of the long-term compensation of his target total remuneration, around 47%. The percentage of pension commitments for the Executive Board Chairman is currently around 7% of his target total remuneration.

For the other Executive Board members, the relative percentage of the fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is between 45% and 51% of their respective total target remuneration and the percentage of all variable remuneration components between around 43% and 49% of their corresponding target total remuneration. The percentage of the short-term (target) compensation of their respective target total remuneration is between around 21% and 25%; that of the long-term compensation of their corresponding target total remuneration, be-tween around 21% and 28%. The percentage of their pension commitments is currently between 0% and around 8% of their respective target total remuneration.

III. Reclaiming or Reducing Variable Remuneration (Clawback)

After the German Corporate Governance Code had entered into force in the version of December 16, 2019 (GCGC 2019), as amended, provisions were included in all newly executed or amended Executive Board employment contracts, each with a future effective date and specify that the company is entitled to reclaim from Executive Board members variable remuneration components already paid out to them in the following cases described:

1. Performance Clawback

If the entitlement to payment of annual short-term variable remuneration and of remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis in relation to the individual component of consolidated net profit is based on audited and approved consolidated financial statements that were objectively incorrect and therefore had to be subsequently corrected in accordance with the relevant accounting standards, and if no or a lower entitlement to payment of variable remuneration components would have arisen based on the corrected audited consolidated financial statements, the company may reclaim the corresponding amount of overpayment from the respective Executive Board member.

2. Compliance Clawback

If an Executive Board member commits, either through gross negligence or willful intent, any dereliction of the duty to exercise the skill and care of a prudent manager faithfully complying with his duties in accordance with Section 93, Subsection 1, of the German Joint Stock Corporation Law "AktG," the company shall be entitled to reclaim from the respective Executive Board member the full or partial repayment of the annual short-term variable remuneration paid out to him for the respective assessment period in which the breach of duty occurred, the remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis related to the individual component of the consolidated net profit, and of the liquidated phantom stock units and/or to declare that member's forfeiture with respect to tranches of phantom stock units yet to be granted.

The Executive Board member shall not be obligated to reimburse the company if more than three years have elapsed as counted from the payment of the respective variable remuneration components up to the time a claim against said member for reimbursement is asserted. The objection of disenrichment in accordance with Section 818, Subsection 3, of the German Civil Code "BGB" is excluded under the remuneration policy. The right to claim damages pursuant to Section 93 of the German Joint Stock Corporation Law "AktG" shall remain unaffected.

IV. Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

1. Terms and Prerequisites for Termination of Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

The employment contracts of Executive Board members are concluded for the term of their respective appointments. Initial appointments are each for a maximum of three years; extensions of an appointment term are for up to five years.

The current terms of the employment contracts of the incumbent members of the Executive Board are as follows:

- Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg: November 10, 2025
- Dr. René Fáber: December 31, 2021
- Rainer Lehmann: February 28, 2025
- John Gerard Mackay: December 31, 2021

Termination of their employment contracts by giving due and proper notice is excluded. For this reason, an employment contract of an Executive Board member can only be terminated by mutual agreement based on a termination agreement or by termination for cause with immediate effect. The company may terminate an Executive Board member's employment contract for cause de-fined by the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG" as "grave cause," particularly in the event that the Supervisory Board revokes this member's appointment for said grave cause pursuant to Section 84, Subsection 3, of AktG. In this case, the statutory periods of notice pursuant to Section 622 of the German Civil Code "BGB" shall apply, unless there is also a compelling reason ("cause") for termination without notice pursuant to Section 626 of BGB.

2. Severance Payments

The employment contracts for Executive Board members provide that a member will receive a severance payment in the event the company terminates the employment contract of said member with immediate effect, provided that said member is not responsible for any grave cause or compelling reason warranting said termination ahead of the regular contract expiration date. The amount of the severance payment shall be two years' salary maximum, but shall not exceed the amount of remuneration that would be payable until the end of the contract term.

3. Non-Competition Clause

The Executive Board employment contracts provide for a post-contractual non-competition clause for a duration of up to two years upon termination of employment with the company. In the event that this non-competition clause is not waived or is nullified, half of the remuneration last paid by the company shall be granted to the respective Executive Board member as compensation for non-competition throughout the non-competition period. Any severance to be paid in connection with the termination of an employment contract to an Executive Board member shall be deducted in full from said compensation for non-competition in accordance with Recommendation G.13 of GCGC 2019 in the future – upon commencement of the respective new contract term – provided that the employment contracts concerned have been extended after GCGC 2019 had entered into force. A different arrangement applies to the Executive Board contract of Rainer Lehmann whose contract term had already been extended earlier and whose contract does not contain any deduction clause.

V. Procedure for Establishing and Implementing as well as Reviewing the Remuneration Policy

The Supervisory Board establishes and regularly reviews the remuneration policy for the Executive Board. The Executive Task Committee of the Supervisory Board prepares the remuneration policy for approval by the full Supervisory Board and makes the respective suggestions.

In the process, the Supervisory Board also reviews the appropriateness of such remuneration in comparison to the remuneration of the Executive Board within the peer group of the company (horizontal appropriateness). The peer group is defined by the Supervisory Board and/or its Executive Task Committee and is adapted as necessary. In defining the composition of the current peer group, the Executive Task Committee first reviewed domestic and foreign companies (from Germany, Europe and the USA) that are each comparable with Sartorius in terms of sector, size and sales. However, further analysis showed that the compensation levels at the relevant foreign companies differ significantly upwards from the compensation levels of the companies based in Germany and that the compensation levels differ considerably in terms of the weighting of their components. Against this background, it was decided to include only companies based in Germany in the peer group, yet to make a deliberately broad selection and to reference a group of companies of different sizes, sectors and capital market indices. The peer group currently comprises the following companies: Bechtle, Carl Zeiss Meditec, Compugroup Medical, DMG, Mori Seiki, Drägerwerk, Drillisch, ElringKlinger, Evotec, Freenet, Fresenius Medical Care, Gerresheimer, Grenke, KWS Saat, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology, Qiagen, Siltronic, Software AG, Symrise, and United Internet.

In establishing the remuneration for the Executive Board members, the Supervisory Board further considers both the compensation of senior management and that of the remaining workforce in relation to the German Group companies (vertical appropriateness). For these purposes, the Supervisory Board defines senior management as the group of executives of the first two management levels below the Executive Board. The Supervisory Board looks not only at the current compensation ratio, but also at how it has developed over time.

If necessary, the Supervisory Board will engage an independent compensation consultant to re-view vertical and horizontal appropriateness; this was last done in 2018. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board also takes into account the requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code when determining and reviewing the remuneration of the Executive Board.

Any conflict of interest in the establishment, implementation and review of the remuneration policy shall be treated by the Supervisory Board in the same way as other conflicts of interest in the person of a Supervisory Board member. The Supervisory Board member concerned is therefore required to disclose any conflict of interest to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and will not participate in the adoption of resolutions or in the deliberations concerned. Disclosure of any conflicts of interest at an early stage ensures that the decisions of the Supervisory Board are not influenced by inappropriate considerations.

2. Remuneration of the Executive Board Members in the Reporting Year

In 2020, the total remuneration for active service provided by all Executive Board members totaled €4,737 K relative to €9,486 K in 2019. Of this aggregate total, €2,440 K accounted for non-performance-based components as "fixed remuneration" (2019: €2,481 K) and €2,297 K for variable performance-based components and multi-year components with a long-term incentive (2019: €7,005 K). Furthermore, as part of the pension commitments to the Executive Board members, the pension service cost totaling €373 K in the reporting year was expensed, following on €308 K in the prior year.

Total Remuneration of the Executive Board Pursuant to Section 314, Subsection 1, No. 6, of the German Commercial Code HGB

	Executive Board (total)		Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg		Dr. René Fáber		Rainer Lehmann		Gerry Mackay	
€ in K	**2020**	2019	**2020**	2019	**2020**	2019	**2020**	2019	**2020**	2019
Fixed remuneration	2,221	2,163	903	888	440	425	438	425	440	425
Fringe benefits [1]	219	318	15	15	13	11	76	151	115	141
Fixed remuneration	**2,440**	**2,481**	**918**	**903**	**453**	**436**	**514**	**576**	**555**	**566**
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year) [2]	1,340	1,184	546	495	261	242	311	237	222	210
Components with a long-term incentive effect										
Consolidated net profit (3 years) [3]	323	281	218	201	0	0	105	80	0	0
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) [4]	634	540	236	222	110	106	178	106	110	106
Shares granted [4]	0	5,000		5,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2,297	**7,005**	**1,000**	**5,918**	**371**	**348**	**594**	**423**	**332**	**316**
Total remuneration	**4,737**	**9,486**	**1,918**	**6,821**	**824**	**784**	**1,108**	**999**	**887**	**882**

1 The amounts contributed to D&O insurance totaling €205 K (2019: €172 K) are not included as these refer to the executive bodies of all companies of the Sartorius Group and are not allocated to the individual insurees.
2 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement
3 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement of the plan in which a fiscal year ended; i.e., for 2020, consolidated net profits for 2018 –2020 (2019: consolidated net profits for 2017-2019).
4 Fair value at the time granted.
For the stock granted to Dr. Kreuzburg in fiscal 2019, this fair value amount is derived from the number of shares granted (13,785 ordinary shares and 13,785 preference shares) and their stock market prices at the time granted (€171.50 and €191.20, resp.). Due to the structure of stock granted, expected dividends are not to be considered in their valuation.

As part of the remuneration component based on the consolidated net profit of three consecutive fiscal years, each Executive Board member receives a partial compensation payment of 50% of his respective target achievement for the first fiscal year under review. Once the total target achievement has been determined after the third fiscal year, final payment is then effected by deducting the particular partial payment already made. The amounts of the partial payments made in total at the end of the reporting year are shown as follows:

€ in K	**2020**	2019
Balance as of Jan. 1 of a fiscal year	375	354
Partial payments deducted	–185	–169
Partial payments effected	280	190
Balance as of Dec. 31 of a fiscal year	**470**	**375**

3. Disclosures on Share-Based Payments

For multi-year components with a long-term incentive, the phantom stock plan must be generally classified as share-based payment just as is the share-based payment agreed to be granted to Dr. Kreuzburg.

The employee benefits expense recognized in profit or loss in connection with the share-based payments is summarized as follows:

€ in K	2020	2019
Executive Board (total)		
Share-based payments	**3,110**	**2,817**
Phantom stock units	1,787	2,286
Shares granted	1,323	531

€ in K	2020	2019
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg		
Share-based payments	**1,990**	**1,500**
Phantom stock units	667	969
Shares granted	1,323	531

€ in K	2020	2019
Dr. René Fáber		
Share-based payments	**293**	**160**
Phantom stock units	293	160
Shares granted	0	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Rainer Lehmann		
Share-based payments	**431**	**378**
Phantom stock units	431	378
Shares granted	0	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Gerry Mackay		
Share-based payments	**293**	**160**
Phantom stock units	293	160
Shares granted	0	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Jörg Pfirrmann (until Feb. 28, 2017)		
Share-based payments	**0**	**110**
Phantom stock units	0	110
Shares granted	0	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)		
Share-based payments	**103**	**509**
Phantom stock units	103	509
Shares granted	0	0

Disclosure of Phantom Stock Units

	Number of phantom stock units	Price on assignment in €	Fair value when granted on Jan. 1 of the particular year € in K	Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2019 € in K	**Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2020 € in K**	Paid in fiscal 2020 € in K	Change in value in fiscal 2020 € in K	Status
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg								
Tranche for fiscal 2016	3,484	57.41	200	500	0	500	0	Paid out in 2020
Tranche for fiscal 2017	2,950	70.51	208	520	520	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2018	2,685	80.32	216	493	539	0	46	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	1,950	113.78	222	335	555	0	220	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**11,069**		**846**	**1,848**	**1,614**	**500**	**266**	
Tranche for fiscal 2020	1,240	190.30	236	0	401	0	165	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	**12,309**		**1,082**	**1,848**	**2,015**	**500**	**431**	
Dr. René Fáber								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	160	266	0	106	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**934**		**106**	**160**	**266**	**0**	**106**	
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	0	187	0	77	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	**1,512**		**216**	**160**	**453**	**0**	**183**	
Rainer Lehmann								
Tranche for fiscal 2017	1,182	70.51	83	208	208	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,289	80.32	104	237	259	0	22	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	160	266	0	106	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**3,405**		**293**	**605**	**733**	**0**	**128**	
Tranche for fiscal 2020	936	190.30	178	0	303	0	125	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	**4,341**		**471**	**605**	**1,036**	**0**	**253**	
Gerry Mackay								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	160	266	0	106	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**934**		**106**	**160**	**266**	**0**	**106**	
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	0	187	0	77	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	**1,512**		**216**	**160**	**453**	**0**	**183**	
Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)								
Tranche for fiscal 2016	2,176	57.41	125	312	0	312	0	Paid out in 2020
Tranche for fiscal 2017	1,844	70.51	130	325	325	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,673	80.32	134	308	336	0	28	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	661	113.78	75	113	188	0	75	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**6,354**		**464**	**1,058**	**849**	**312**	**103**	
Jörg Pfirrmann (until Feb. 28, 2017)								
Tranche for fiscal 2016	1,416	57.41	81	203	0	203	0	Paid out in 2020
Tranche for fiscal 2017	644	70.51	45	114	114	0	0	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	**2,060**		**126**	**317**	**114**	**203**	**0**	

4. Pension Commitments

The projected pension payments, the present value of pension obligations and service cost are shown in the following table:

	Projected pension payment	Present value of the obligation (IFRS)		Service cost (IFRS)	
€ in K	p.a.	**Dec. 31, 2020**	Dec. 31, 2019	**2020**	2019
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	255	4,943	4,416	311	270
Rainer Lehmann	45	192	98	62	38
Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)	0	0	861	0	0
	300	**5,135**	**5,375**	**373**	**308**

5. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Supervisory Board

The remuneration for Supervisory Board members is defined in the Articles of Association of Sartorius AG and comprises fixed remuneration, meeting attendance fees and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Members serving as chairperson and vice chairperson of the Supervisory Board receive higher fixed remuneration.

Members and chairpersons of Supervisory Board committees, except for those of Nomination Committee or the committee pursuant to Section 27, Subsection 3, of the German Codetermination Law (MitBestG), are entitled to receive additional annual fixed amounts and meeting attendance fees and reimbursement of their out-of-pocket expenses.

6. Remuneration of the Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2020	2019
Remuneration for the Supervisory Board Members		
Total remuneration	**1,049**	**1,024**
Fixed remuneration	675	675
Compensation for committee work	120	120
Meeting attendance fee	186	174
Total remuneration for the Sartorius Stedim Biotech subgroup	68	55
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	68	55

€ in K	2020	2019
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)		
Total remuneration	**262**	**246**
Fixed remuneration	135	135
Compensation for committee work	33	33
Meeting attendance fee	26	23
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	68	55

€ in K	2020	2019
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman) [1]		
Total remuneration	**140**	**137**
Fixed remuneration	90	90
Compensation for committee work	24	24
Meeting attendance fee	26	23

€ in K	2020	2019
Annette Becker [1]		
Total remuneration	**54**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	9	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Uwe Bretthauer [1]		
Total remuneration	**95**	**92**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	24	24
Meeting attendance fee	26	23

€ in K	2020	2019
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D. (as of Jan. 1, 2020)		
Total remuneration	**56**	**0**
Fixed remuneration	45	0
Meeting attendance fee	11	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Dr. Daniela Favoccia		
Total remuneration	**56**	**53**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	8

€ in K	2020	2019
Petra Kirchhoff		
Total remuneration	**56**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Karoline Kleinschmidt [1]		
Total remuneration	**56**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Dietmar Müller (as if May 16, 2020) [1]		
Total remuneration	**31**	**0**
Fixed remuneration	28	0
Meeting attendance fee	3	0

€ in K	2020	2019
Ilke Hildegard Panzer		
Total remuneration	**56**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheper		
Total remuneration	**56**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützschler		
Total remuneration	**108**	**107**
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	39	39
Meeting attendance fee	24	23

Former Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2020	2019
Michael Dohrmann (until May 15, 2020) [1]		
Total remuneration	**23**	**56**
Fixed remuneration	17	45
Meeting attendance fee	6	11

€ in K	2020	2019
Dr. Guido Oelkers (until Dec. 31, 2019)		
Total remuneration	**0**	**53**
Fixed remuneration	0	45
Meeting attendance fee	0	8

1 The employee representatives declared that they donate their Supervisory Board remuneration to the foundation Hans-Böckler-Stiftung according to the guidelines of the German Trade Union Association.

Beyond their Supervisory Board remuneration, the employee representatives who are employees within the Sartorius Group receive compensation that is not related to their service on the Supervisory Board.

Remuneration of Former Managing Directors

€ in K	2020	2019
Remuneration of former members of the Executive Board and managing directors as well as their surviving dependents	1,427	499
Retirement benefits and pension obligations to former members of the Executive Board and managing directors as well as their surviving dependents	8,764	9,537