

Sartorius Group

Remuneration Report

Extract from the Annual Report 2025

Remuneration Report

1. Remuneration Policy and Target Achievement in 2025

A. Main Features of the Remuneration Policy and Contribution Toward Promoting the Corporate Strategy and Long-Term Development of the Company

The remuneration policy for the Executive Board was approved by the Annual General Meeting on March 27, 2025. It aims to remunerate the members of the Executive Board appropriately in line with their tasks and responsibilities and to directly consider the performance of each member of the Executive Board and the success of the company. For this reason, the remuneration policy includes both short-term and long-term variable remuneration components in addition to fixed remuneration components.

The company strategy seeks to achieve profitable growth and a sustained, long-term increase in the value of the company. This strategy is the basis from which the structure of the remuneration policy is derived for the Executive Board of Sartorius AG: The short-term variable remuneration depends on annual corporate targets that are aligned with key performance indicators for profitable growth of the company. Long-term remuneration is based on corporate objectives that reflect the sustainable long-term growth of the Group and the long-term performance of the share price, which directly mirrors the development of the company's value. As a result, the company's remuneration policy creates incentives to promote the long-term and positive sustainable development of the company.

The policy for remuneration of the Executive Board members is designed to be simple, clear and understandable. It meets the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act ("AktG") as well as the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code ("**GCGC**") with the exception of any divergences explained in the Declaration of Compliance with the Recommendations of the GCGC as amended from time to time. The existing divergences in the reporting year from the recommendations of the applicable GCGC in the area of remuneration are given below.

B. Details of the Remuneration Policy 2025

		Remuneration components	Structure of the remuneration components	Maximum bonus (in % of the target amount)	Maximum remuneration	Further benefits	
Fixed	Cash	Fixed remuneration	Basic remuneration + Fringe benefits	100%	Maximum amount of all cash remuneration components for the respective fiscal year	Compensation for post-contractual non-competition clause (50% of most recent remuneration)	
		Retirement benefits	Basic amount Additional amount (matching contribution)	100% 150%			
Variable	Cash	Short-term variable remuneration	Sales revenue Order intake (Group and/or division)	40%		150%	Clawback / Malus
			Underlying EBITDA (Group and/or division)	40%			
			Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA (Group and/or division)	10%			
			Employee motivation	10%			
Long-term variable remuneration	Shares	Share-based remuneration	Consolidated net profit	25%	150%	Severance cap in the event of early contract termination	
			Reduction of CO ₂ -equivalent emission intensity ¹	25%	150%		
			One-time allotment; afterwards, no measurement of inflow	50%	One-time allotment; afterwards, no measurement of inflow	Proportional grant date fair value of share-based payment for the respective fiscal year	Extraordinary performance

¹ In accordance with a Supervisory Board resolution of December 4, 2025, the “reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity” long-term remuneration component will be divided into two subordinate targets starting from 2026. The tranches for this component will be based on the new climate targets established in accordance with the publicly recognized framework of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi).

I. Remuneration Components

1. Overview of the Individual Remuneration Components

Remuneration consists of fixed and variable components. The fixed components are the fixed annual salary and fringe benefits. The variable performance-based components are comprised of short-term components with a one-year assessment basis and of long-term components with a multi-year assessment basis. In addition, there are pension commitments, which depend, among other things, on the amount of the own contribution made by the respective Executive Board member in the form of deferred compensation for variable remuneration components, and which are therefore also variable.

2. Fixed Remuneration Components

a) Fixed Annual Remuneration

Fixed annual remuneration is cash compensation related to a specific fiscal year, and is based in particular on the area of duties and responsibilities of the respective Executive Board member. This fixed annual remuneration is paid in twelve monthly installments. The fixed salary is prorated if the member joins or leaves the Executive Board during the year.

b) Fringe benefits

Beyond the remuneration components stated above, the members of the Executive Board receive the following fringe benefits: each member is entitled to use a company car that can also be utilized for private purposes and to be covered by accident insurance taken out in the respective Executive Board member’s name as a beneficiary. In addition, the company maintains a D&O insurance policy concluded for Executive

Board members as beneficiaries. The respective insurance premiums are not of a remunerative nature and are therefore not recognized as remuneration.

Moreover, for Executive Board members residing outside Germany, the costs for taking flights home and running two households as well as ancillary costs may also be covered until their departure as members of the Executive Board.

3. Variable Performance-Based Remuneration Components

a) Short-Term Variable Remuneration with a One-Year Assessment Basis

In addition to the fixed remuneration components, all Executive Board members are entitled to receive short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis.

Target Parameters

The short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis currently consists of four individual components that relate to three subordinate financial targets – average of sales revenue and order intake, underlying EBITDA, ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA – and the subordinate non-financial target of employee engagement.

The financial target parameters are key control elements for profitable growth as well as for a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the business and serve to implement the overarching strategic goals of the Group. The Supervisory Board selected employee engagement as a non-financial target parameter as this reflects the dimension of employee loyalty, which is of key importance for the company's competitiveness on the labor market and therefore for the successful long-term development of Sartorius. The employee engagement target parameter replaces the employee net promoter score (ENPS) used in previous years, as ENPS has proven since its introduction to be a particularly sensitive parameter with limited informative value.. The Supervisory Board believes that employee engagement will serve as an appropriate alternative parameter for measuring employee motivation. The employee engagement target parameter is currently measured twice a year as part of Group-wide employee surveys.

Measurement of Target Achievement and Payment

For each target parameter, the Supervisory Board has defined a formula that is used to calculate the amount to be paid out according to the degree of target achievement for the associated individual component. For each of these components, the Supervisory Board also sets (i) a minimum target to be achieved below which the amount that will be paid out is zero, and (ii) a maximum target to be achieved above which the amount that will be paid out will no longer increase. Therefore, the amount paid out for each subordinate target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap is currently 150% for all subordinate targets.

For each of the individual components of short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis, the Supervisory Board sets a separate individual target amount for every Executive Board member before the beginning of a fiscal year. This target amount is used as the basis to determine the specific amount to be paid out according to the particular target achievement for the fiscal year in question. The targets are weighted for the individual Executive Board members according to their area of responsibility and relate to the divisions and/or to the Group, respectively.

The Supervisory Board derives each target value of the subordinate financial targets from the approved annual budget for a respective fiscal year and determines the degree of target achievement by comparing it with the actual result reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited and approved for the respective fiscal year. When it comes to the non-financial target parameters, the degree of target achievement is determined by comparing the target values set by the Supervisory Board with the respective actual results.

The Supervisory Board ensures the comparability of actual figures with target figures by taking account of factors not included in operational planning. In fiscal 2025, these primarily related to the acquisition of MATTEK in July 2025.

Annual short-term variable remuneration is calculated for a fiscal year ended and paid in the following fiscal year. The short-term variable remuneration is prorated if the member joins or leaves the Executive Board during the year.


The subordinate targets within the short-term variable remuneration are weighted for the Executive Board members as follows:

Subordinate Target	Executive Board Chairman Chief Financial Officer	Executive Board Members with Division Responsibility
Related to the Sartorius Group		
Average calculated from sales revenue order intake	40%	10%
Underlying EBITDA	40%	10%
Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA	10%	10%
Employee motivation	10%	3%
Related to the particular division		
Average calculated from sales revenue order intake	--	30%
Underlying EBITDA	--	30%
Employee motivation	--	7%

Subordinate Target "Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake"

The subordinate target "Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake" is a key performance indicator of growth. The target value is derived from the budget and set by the Supervisory Board for the Group and divisions. Target achievement is 100% if the actual figure for the average of sales revenue | order intake equals the target amount. The minimum target achievement is 90% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 110%. If 90% of the target amount is achieved, 50% of the associated individual target sum will be paid out; if the target is achieved at less than 90%, no payment is rendered for this subordinate target. If 110% of the target value is achieved, an amount equal to 150% of the corresponding individual target amount will be paid out; if the target is exceeded beyond this, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Intermediate values are interpolated linearly. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the currency-adjusted actual figures for sales revenue and order intake according to the company's audited and approved consolidated financial statements. For fiscal 2025, the target amount for the Group was €3,480 million. The Bioprocess Solutions Division had a target of €2,775 million and the Lab Products & Services Division a target of €705 million.

Sales revenue | Order intake




Due to the company's performance in 2025, the amounts achieved for the "Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake" subordinate target in the Group and in the two divisions – Bioprocess Solutions and Lab Products & Services – were over 90% of the target value. At the Group level, target achievement stood at 104.37% of the target value, resulting in a payout rate of 121.9% for the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer. In the Bioprocess Solutions Division, target achievement stood at 106.25% of the target value, corresponding to a payout rate of 131.3%, and in the Lab Products & Services Division at 96.96%, corresponding to a payout rate of 84.8%.

Subordinate Target "Underlying EBITDA"

The subordinate target "Underlying EBITDA" is a key indicator of the Group's profitability, which can also be used to present the Group's operating performance in a comparable way internationally. Underlying EBITDA represents earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization adjusted for extraordinary effects. The target is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group or division, respectively. Target achievement is 100% if the actual figure for underlying EBITDA equals this defined target amount. The minimum target achievement is 70% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 125%. The payout level is nonlinear to the degree of target achievement, i.e. if 70% of the target is achieved, a payout of 70% of the corresponding individual target amount is made, and if 125% of the target is achieved, a payout of 150% of the corresponding individual target amount is made. If the target is achieved at less than 70%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. By contrast, if the target is achieved by 125% or more, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual underlying EBITDA figure, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as by taking into account current exchange rates. The target value for the Group in fiscal 2025 was €1,030 million. The Bioprocess Solutions Division had a target of €874 million and the Lab Products & Services Division a target of €156 million.

Underlying EBITDA




In fiscal 2025, target achievement for the subordinate target "Underlying EBITDA" stood at 101.98% of the respective target value for the Group as a whole, 103.77% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division and 92.01% for the Lab Products & Services Division, which translates into payout rates of 104.0% for the Group, 107.5% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division and 92.0% for the Lab Products & Services Division, for payment to the members of the Executive Board in accordance with the respective weighting of the subordinate targets.

Subordinate Target "Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA"

The subordinate target "Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA" is a key financial ratio regarding the Group's debt financing capacity. This ratio is calculated as the quotient of net debt and underlying EBITDA. The target is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group. Target achievement is 100% if the actual figure for the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA equals this defined target amount. The level

of the bonus paid lies between 50% and 150% of the respective target amount. If the target ratio is reached, the bonus level to be paid is 100%. If net debt to underlying EBITDA is above the target ratio, the bonus level will decrease proportionately down to 50% if the maximum amount defined by the Supervisory Board for the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA is reached. If the ratio exceeds this maximum amount, no bonus will be paid for this subordinate target. By contrast, if net debt to underlying EBITDA is below the target ratio, the bonus amount is capped at 150%, with the associated ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA derived mathematically on a linear proportional basis from the maximum and target values for this ratio as defined by the Supervisory Board. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, taking into account current exchange rates and the inflows and outflows entailed by strategic (capital) measures such as acquisitions, provided that such inflows and outflows are not included in the target ratio. The target value in fiscal 2025 was 3.54.

Ratio of Net debt to Underlying EBITDA




In fiscal 2025, target achievement for the subordinate target “Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA” stood at 95%, resulting in a respective payout for this subordinate target.

Subordinate Target “Employee Motivation”

The “Employee Motivation” subordinate target refers to the non-financial component of employ satisfaction. When applying the double materiality assessment in accordance with the CSRD, it falls under the business conduct topic area of the ESRS. Further information, for example on policies and actions, can be found in the Sustainability Report. The target is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group or division, respectively. Target achievement is 100% if the actual average employee motivation from the two surveys equals the target amount defined by the Supervisory Board. The level of the bonus paid lies between 50% and 150% of the respective target amount. If the target value for employee motivation is reached, the bonus level to be paid is 100%. If the employee motivation is below the target value, the bonus level will decrease proportionately down to 50% if the minimum amount defined by the Supervisory Board is reached. If the employee motivation is below the minimum value set by the Supervisory Board, no bonus will be paid for this subordinate target. By contrast, if employee motivation is above the target value, the bonus paid increases proportionally to a maximum amount of 150% (cap). The Supervisory Board set a target of 4.0 in fiscal 2025.

Employee motivation



In fiscal 2025, the target achievement for the “Employee Motivation” subordinate target was 94% of the target value for the Group, 91% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division and 100% for the Lab Products & Services Division, resulting in a respective payout for this subordinate target.

Taking into account the weighting of the subordinate targets, the total payout rate for the short-term variable remuneration was 109.30% of the target remuneration for the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief Financial Officer, 112.90% of the target remuneration for the Board member responsible for the Bioprocess Solutions Division, and 94.90% of the target remuneration for the Board member responsible for the Lab Products & Services Division.

b) Long-Term Variable Remuneration Components

In the reporting year, the long-term variable remuneration components for all members of the Executive Board, with the exception of the new Executive Board Chairman Dr. Michael Grosse, consisted of the following three individual components: Each individual component is based on the development of consolidated net profit, the reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity and the development of the Sartorius AG preference share price over a four-year assessment period. As a result, the long-term variable remuneration components are also aligned with target parameters that measure profitable growth and a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company and the achievement of the climate targets derived from the company’s sustainability strategy, and thus serve to implement the company’s overarching strategic objectives.

The above-mentioned long-term variable remuneration components are weighted as follows: 25% each for consolidated net profit and reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity and 50% development in the share price of the preference share (phantom stock plan). For each of the individual non-share-based components of long-term variable remuneration, a separate individual target amount is set for each Executive Board member, on the basis of which the specific payment amount is determined in each case based on the level at which the associated targets were achieved for the relevant fiscal years.

All Executive Board members were additionally granted share-based compensation as a further long-term variable remuneration component. The long-term increase in the value of the company as an overriding strategic objective of the company is also promoted by this share-based compensation and the participation provided by this in the development of the price of the company’s shares. The respective long-term variable remuneration components together generally represent the majority of the variable compensation components for each Executive Board member.


The “consolidated net profit” and “reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity” components of long-term variable remuneration are each weighted at 25%. In contrast, the “development of preference share price” component of long-term variable remuneration is weighted at 50%. As a result, the share-based portion of variable remuneration, in deviation from Recommendation G.10, sentence 1 of the GCGC, does not, in principle, constitute the predominant portion of Executive Board members’ variable remuneration. The Supervisory Board believes that even with the current weighting, an incentive structure is achieved which is geared to the sustainable and long-term development of the company. However, in the case of Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg – the former Chairman of the Executive Board whose term of office ended on June 30, 2025 – variable remuneration is predominantly share-based in line with the Recommendation due to the additional share component granted to him.

Consolidated Net Profit

The individual component based on consolidated net profit has an assessment period of four consecutive fiscal years and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche in question is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The payout amount for the respective tranche is based on the total target achievement for the respective measurement period, which corresponds to the average target achievement for each of the four fiscal years of the relevant measurement period. For each fiscal year, the Supervisory Board annually defines a target for consolidated net profit in euros. To determine the level of target achievement for a fiscal year, the consolidated net profit that is reported in the company’s consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved and excluding amortization (impairment of the value of intangible assets due to business combinations pursuant to IFRS 3) is compared with the respective target set by the Supervisory Board. In fiscal 2025, the Supervisory Board adjusted this component in order to objectify the calculation from valuation effects from contingent considerations that were not included in the planning.

The amount paid out is determined on the basis of the individual target amount and the formula defined by the Supervisory Board. It establishes (i) a minimum target achievement level of 50%, below which the payout is zero, and (ii) a maximum target achievement level, above which the payout amount no longer increases. Therefore, the amount paid out for this remuneration target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap currently stands at 120% for all individual target amounts and is reached at a target achievement level of 120%. The remuneration policy provides that for tranches beginning from fiscal 2025 onward, the cap stands at 150% and is reached at a target achievement level of 125%. This remuneration component is generally paid after the end of the fourth fiscal year of the assessment period for the tranche in question.

Average net profit




For fiscal 2025, the 2022 tranche was due. Target achievement stood at 72.5%. Target achievement for the multi-year assessment period beginning in 2025 cannot be determined until the audited and approved consolidated financial statements for 2028 are available.

Reduction CO₂-equivalent emission intensity

The individual component related to the reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity has an assessment period of four fiscal years and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche in question is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The amount paid out for a particular tranche depends on the individual target amount and target achievement for the respective assessment period. The Supervisory Board sets a target value for each tranche for the reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity during the assessment period. This is based on the relevant target value from the company's sustainability strategy, which is derived from the audited Non-financial Group Statement or sustainability reporting for the previous year. At present, the target value is 10% per fiscal year. To determine the target achievement of this parameter, the final value used is based on the actual value of the CO₂ emission intensity reached in the last fiscal year of the respective four-year assessment period for the corresponding tranche, as reported in the respective audited Non-financial Group Statement. Corrections are made to base effects and recording inaccuracies to take into account progress in the quality of available data.

The amount paid out is determined on the basis of the individual target amount and the formula defined by the Supervisory Board. It establishes (i) a minimum target achievement level of 50%, below which the payout is zero, and (ii) a maximum target achievement level, above which the payout amount no longer increases. Therefore, the amount paid out for this remuneration target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap stands at 120% and is reached at a target achievement level of 120%. The remuneration policy provides that for tranches beginning from fiscal 2025 onward, target achievement is capped at 150%. This remuneration component is paid out after the end of the fourth fiscal year of the assessment period for the tranche in question.

CO₂ emission intensity



Target achievement for the first tranche of this component, introduced in 2022 was 65.1%. Target achievement for the multi-year assessment period beginning in 2025 cannot be determined until the audited and approved consolidated financial statements for 2028 are available.

The Supervisory Board resolved in December 2025 to refine this component using the revised climate strategy within the framework of the existing remuneration policy. Starting in 2026, the tranches for this component will be based on the new climate targets established in accordance with the publicly recognized framework of the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi). This component will be divided into two subordinate targets in the future: an absolute CO₂ reduction target for Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions in tons of CO₂, weighted at 2/3 within this component, and a target to reduce CO₂-equivalent emission intensity in relation to value added, weighted at 1/3 within this component.

Development of the Preference Share Price (Phantom Stock Plan)

As the third individual component of long-term variable remuneration, the Executive Board members, with the exception of the new Executive Board Chairman Dr. Michael Grosse, receive virtual shares, known as phantom stock units. Through the issue of such phantom shares, Executive Board members are treated as if they were owners of a certain number of preference shares in Sartorius AG, without, however, being entitled to receive dividends. The development of the value of these phantom stocks is linked with the development of the Sartorius preference share; both increases and decreases in the share price are taken into account. Later, the value of these phantom stocks is assessed based on the share price at the time, and its equivalent is paid out in cash, provided that the associated conditions are met. Phantom stocks cannot be traded and do not confer any rights to purchase shares.

According to the Sartorius phantom stock plan, each Executive Board member is credited at the beginning of every year with phantom stock units valued at an agreed monetary value. The value of these phantom stocks can be paid out only as an entire annual tranche. Payment can be requested at the earliest after a period of four years and no later than after eight years. If a member is appointed to the Executive Board during a year, this member will be assigned phantom stock units retroactively as of the beginning of this fiscal year (pro rata temporis, if applicable).

An Executive Board member is entitled to receive payment for phantom stock units only if the share price at the time of such payment request has appreciated at least 7.5% per year relative to the time the phantom stock units were assigned or if the share price outperformed the TecDAX as a comparative index. In addition, the value of the phantom stock units must be at least 50% of the grant value. The phantom stock plan rules out subsequent changes to the parameters used for comparative stock valuation.

Assignment of these phantom stock units and later payment of their monetary equivalent depend on the mean value calculated from the average prices of the Sartorius AG preference share, with said prices quoted in the closing auction of Xetra trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (or a corresponding successor trading system) over the last 20 days of trading of the previous year (in the case of granting) or over the last 20 days of trading prior to submission of a payment request (in the case of payment). This serves to compensate for any short-term fluctuations in the share prices.

The payout amount is capped at a maximum of 2.5 times the share price at the time the phantom stock units were granted, based in each case on the individual annual tranche.

Under the current terms of the phantom stock plan, payment for phantom stock is blocked for the four weeks preceding the scheduled publication date of quarterly results and for the 30 calendar days before the scheduled publication of the half-year results and preliminary year-end results, as well as for 20 days of trading on the stock exchange following the actual publication of quarterly and preliminary year-end results. These black-out periods are intended to ensure that payments are only made during periods in which the most recent business results have already been processed in the capital market and the regular publication of further business results is still sufficiently far in the future. Early payment of the tranches is not provided for.

The fair value grant price for this remuneration component is €219.41 for 2025. Target achievement for this subordinate target is reported in the remuneration report after vesting or exercise by the Executive Board members; i.e., between 2029 and 2033.

With the 2025 remuneration policy, the Supervisory Board discontinued this component for the future, i.e., for the appointment of Executive Board members or conclusion of Executive Board contracts after January 1, 2025. This applied to the Executive Board Chairman, Dr. Michael Grosse, whose term of appointment began on July 1, 2025.

Share-Based Payment

Remuneration in the form of company shares is additionally granted to the Executive Board members. These shares are subject to a holding period of at least four years from the beginning of the respective term of appointment. For the purposes of share-based remuneration, the Supervisory Board defines a total grant date fair value for the respective term of appointment that is converted into a corresponding number of shares based on the current stock market price of the respective class of share at the time of granting. The shares in question are then transferred in full to the beneficiary at the beginning of his or her term of appointment, but may not be sold before the holding period has expired. If the beneficiary leaves the Executive Board prior to the end of his or her term of appointment, conditions can be set so that the shares granted are forfeited in whole or in part, depending on the time of the beneficiary's resignation or departure, and must be transferred from the beneficiary back to the company.

Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer and Dr. René Fáber were granted share-based remuneration in the form of company shares as of January 1, 2024. Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer was granted 1,496 ordinary shares at an exercise price of €234.00 and 1,186 preference shares at an exercise price of €295.10 for a contract period of two years and four months. The shares granted are subject to a holding period ending on December 31, 2027. As part of her contract extension, Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer was promised 4,268 ordinary shares at an exercise price of €192.20 and 5,203 preference shares at an exercise price of €234.30 in fiscal year 2025, which will be transferred on May 1, 2026. Dr. René Fáber was granted 1,923 ordinary shares at an exercise price of €234.00 and 1,525 preference shares at an exercise price of €295.10 for a contract period of three years. The shares granted are subject to a holding period ending on December 31, 2027.

On April 1, 2024, Dr. Florian Funck was granted share-based remuneration in the form of shares in the company, consisting of 1,500 ordinary shares at an exercise price of €300.00 and 1,207 preference shares at an exercise price of €372.70 for a contract period of three years. If Dr. Florian Funck leaves the company at his own request after August 31, 2025 and before March 31, 2027, half of his entitlements to be granted said shares shall lapse. The shares are subject to a four-year holding period ending on March 31, 2028.

On July 1, 2025, Dr. Michael Grosse was granted share-based remuneration in the form of shares in the company, consisting of 7,741 ordinary shares at an exercise price of €174.40 and 6,353 preference shares at an exercise price of €212.50 for a contract period of three years. If Dr. Michael Grosse leaves the company at his own request prior to December 31, 2026, his entitlements to be granted said shares by transfer shall lapse in their entirety. If he leaves the company at his own request after January 1, 2027 and before June 30, 2028, half of his entitlements to be granted said shares shall lapse. The shares are subject to a four-year holding period ending on June 30, 2029.

4. Pension Commitments

The members of the Executive Board generally receive pension commitments as defined-benefit plans for their first reappointment. At the request of the Executive Board member concerned, the company will take out a corresponding pension liability insurance policy for the duration of the employment relationship, into which the respective pension contributions will be paid. The pension contribution consists of a base amount of 14% of the respective member's annual fixed remuneration. If desired, the Executive Board member in question can pay in an additional 7% of the gross amount paid to the Executive Board member in the fiscal year in question as short-term variable compensation and as long-term variable compensation attributable to net profit as a personal contribution by way of deferred compensation. If a member of the Executive Board exercises this right, the company will in turn make an additional contribution in the same amount (known as a matching contribution benefit). For the purpose of determining the target total compensation and the relative share of the pension commitments in a member's target total remuneration, only the basic amount to be paid by the company and the matching benefit contribution were taken into account (based on 100% target achievement of the relevant variable remuneration components).

Pursuant to the insurance terms and conditions, the pension benefit can be granted in the form of a retirement pension or a lump-sum payment for reaching the regular retirement age or needing to retire due to disability, as well

as in the form of surviving dependents' benefits for widows and orphans, according to which particular option an Executive Board member elects. The company does not guarantee the paid-in capital or an annual interest rate.

Furthermore, an earlier pension agreement granted to Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg provides for him to receive a monthly pension dependent on the basic salary of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz") in the respective version applicable. With each full year of service on the Executive Board, 5% of his full pension is vested until his fully vested pension is reached after 20 years. In this case, these retirement benefits were fully vested, taking his years of service on the Executive Board into account, at the end of December 31, 2021. His retirement benefits will be granted in the form of a pension in the cases where he reaches the regular retirement age or needs to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of a pension for widows and orphans and shall correspond to 70% of the monthly pension benefits of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz"). These additional pension commitments are considered in the determination of Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg's target total remuneration and of the relative proportion of his pension commitments in his target total remuneration along with the respective employee benefit expense attributable thereto.

The regular retirement age for all pension commitments is 65. There are no early retirement regulations, except in the case of disability.

5. Other Remuneration Components

The remuneration policy provides that the Supervisory Board may grant special compensation at its reasonable discretion for extraordinary performance by a member of the Executive Board. This option was not used in the reporting year.

II. Target Total Remuneration; Relative Percentages of Fixed and Variable Remuneration Components

The Supervisory Board determines a specific target total remuneration for each Executive Board member. The target total remuneration is the sum of all remuneration components relevant for total remuneration. For the variable components, the target amount is taken as a basis in each case of 100% target achievement, provided that a target is measured. In the case of share-based remuneration granted, the prorated grant value is recognized for each year of the associated contract term to ensure transparent and traceable reporting for the purposes of target total remuneration. Regarding pension commitments, it is further assumed that the Executive Board members will exercise their right to receive deferred compensation of their variable remuneration components (based on 100% achievement of targets) to the maximum extent permitted and that the company will therefore also pay each member a corresponding additional amount as a matching contribution.

For the former Executive Board Chairman, Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg, the relative percentage of fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is roughly 29% and the percentage of the variable remuneration components as a whole roughly 63% of his target total remuneration. The proportion of short-term (target) compensation in his target total remuneration is roughly 17% and that of long-term (target) compensation in his target total remuneration roughly 45%. Pension commitments for the Executive Board Chairman currently account for roughly 9% of his target total remuneration.

For the new Executive Board Chairman, Dr. Michael Grosse, the relative percentage of fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is roughly 35% and the percentage of the variable remuneration components as a whole roughly 65% of his target total remuneration. The proportion of short-term (target) compensation in his target total remuneration is roughly 24% and that of long-term (target) compensation in his target total remuneration roughly 40%.

For the other Executive Board members, the relative percentage of the fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is between roughly 36% and 40% of their respective target total remuneration and the percentage of all variable remuneration components between roughly 57% and 60% of their target total remuneration. In this context, short-term (target) compensation accounts for between roughly 24% and 25% of target total remuneration, while long-term (target) compensation accounts for between roughly 33% and 37% of target total remuneration. Pension commitments currently account for roughly 7% of target total remuneration.

The defined relative proportions of the remuneration components correspond in their respective amounts to the requirements of the relevant remuneration policy.

III. Reclaiming or Reducing Variable Remuneration (Clawback)

All Executive Board employment contracts contain provisions specifying that the company is entitled to reclaim from Executive Board members variable remuneration components already paid out to them or to reduce variable remuneration not yet paid out in the following cases:

1. Performance Clawback

If the entitlement to payment of annual short-term variable remuneration and of remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis in relation to the individual component of consolidated net profit is based on audited and approved consolidated financial statements that were objectively incorrect and therefore had to be subsequently corrected in accordance with the relevant accounting standards, and if no or a lower entitlement to payment of variable remuneration components would have arisen based on the corrected audited consolidated financial statements, the company may reclaim the corresponding amount of overpayment from the respective Executive Board member (performance clawback) or, if the remuneration has not yet been paid out, reduce the amount to be paid out accordingly (performance malus).

2. Compliance Clawback

If an Executive Board member commits, either through gross negligence or willful intent, any dereliction of the duty to exercise the skill and care of a prudent manager faithfully complying with his or her duties in accordance with Section 93, Subsection 1 AktG, the company is entitled to reclaim from the respective Executive Board member the full or partial repayment of the annual short-term variable remuneration paid out to him or her for the respective assessment period in which the breach of duty occurred, of the remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis related to the individual component of the consolidated net profit, and of the liquidated phantom stock units. If the relevant variable remuneration has not yet been paid out, the company is entitled, under the conditions set out in the previous sentence, to reduce it in full or in part (compliance malus).

The Executive Board member shall not be obligated to reimburse the company if more than three years have elapsed as counted from the payment of the respective variable remuneration components up to the time a claim against said member for reimbursement is asserted. The objection of disenrichment in accordance with Section 818, Subsection 3, of the German Civil Code "BGB" is excluded under the remuneration policy. The right to claim damages pursuant to Section 93 AktG shall remain unaffected.

3. Exercise

In fiscal 2025, none of the conditions for reclaiming or reducing remuneration under these clawback provisions existed. Accordingly, no use was made of this right to exercise a clawback option.

IV. Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

1. Terms and Prerequisites for Termination of Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

The employment contracts of Executive Board members are concluded for the term of their respective appointments. Initial appointments are each for a maximum of three years; extensions of an appointment term are for up to five years.

The current terms of the employment contracts of the incumbent members of the Executive Board are as follows:

Dr. Michael Grosse: June 30, 2028

Dr. René Fáber: December 31, 2026

Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer: April 30, 2026 (extended until April 30, 2031)

Dr. Florian Funck: March 31, 2027

Termination of their employment contracts by giving due and proper notice is excluded. For this reason, an employment contract of an Executive Board member can only be terminated by mutual agreement based on a termination agreement or by termination for good cause with immediate effect. Extraordinary termination for good cause by the company can also occur in particular in the event of the revocation of the appointment of a member of the Executive Board by the Supervisory Board for cause in accordance with Section 84, Subsection 3 AktG. In this case, the statutory periods of notice pursuant to Section 622 of the German Civil Code ("BGB") shall apply, unless there is also cause for termination without notice pursuant to Section 626 BGB.

In the course of Dr. Grosse's appointment as Chairman of the Executive Board as of July 1, 2025, Dr. Kreuzburg resigned from his position as of June 30, 2025, but remained available to Sartorius in an advisory capacity until his employment contract expired on November 10, 2025. He continued to receive the remuneration components agreed in his previous employment contract. However, no further virtual shares were issued under the phantom stock plan for 2025. Instead, a compensation payment of equal value will be made. Starting from November 11, 2025, Dr. Kreuzburg is receiving compensation for the agreed post-contractual non-competition period of 2 years.

2. Severance Payments

The employment contracts for Executive Board members provide that a member will receive a severance payment in the event the company terminates the employment contract of said member with immediate effect, provided that said member is not responsible for any grave cause or compelling reason warranting said termination ahead of the regular contract expiration date. The maximum severance payment equals two years' remuneration (including variable components), but no more than the amount of remuneration that would be payable until the end of the contract term.

Furthermore, in the event of early termination of employment on the Executive Board by mutual agreement, the company may also grant, or agree to grant, severance payments, the amount of which shall be limited, in turn, to a maximum of two years' remuneration (including variable components) and shall not compensate for more than the remaining term of the member's employment contract.

3. Non-Competition Clause

The Executive Board employment contracts provide for a post-contractual non-competition clause for a duration of up to two years upon termination of employment with the company. In the event that this non-competition clause is not waived or is nullified, half of the remuneration last paid by the company shall be granted to the respective Executive Board member as compensation for non-competition throughout the

non-competition period. Any severance to be paid to an Executive Board member in connection with the termination of their employment contract shall be deducted in full from said compensation for non-competition in accordance with Recommendation G.13 of the GCGC dated December 16, 2019.

V. Procedure for Establishing, Implementing and Reviewing the Remuneration Policy

The Supervisory Board establishes and regularly reviews the remuneration policy for the Executive Board. The Executive Task Committee of the Supervisory Board prepares the remuneration policy for approval by the full Supervisory Board and makes the respective suggestions.

In the process, the Supervisory Board also reviews the appropriateness of such remuneration in comparison to the remuneration of the Executive Board within the peer group of the company (horizontal appropriateness). The peer group is defined by the Supervisory Board and/or its Executive Task Committee and is adapted as necessary. In 2022, the Supervisory Board conducted a benchmarking analysis of Executive Board remuneration with the assistance of a neutral external remuneration consultant and, in this context, reviewed and reconstituted the peer group. In determining the composition of the peer group, the Supervisory Board identified domestic and foreign companies that are comparable to the company in terms of industry, size and sales. This updated peer group currently includes the following companies: Beiersdorf, Carl Zeiss Meditec, Drägerwerk, Gerresheimer, Qiagen, Symrise, SYNLAB, bioMérieux, Coloplast, Eurofins Scientific, Lonza Group, Smith&Nephew, Steris and UCB.

In establishing the remuneration for the Executive Board members, the Supervisory Board further considers both the compensation of senior management and that of the remaining workforce in relation to the German Group companies (vertical appropriateness). For these purposes, the Supervisory Board defines senior management as the group of executives of the first two management levels below the Executive Board. The Supervisory Board looks not only at the current compensation ratio, but also at how it has developed over time.

If necessary, the Supervisory Board will engage an independent compensation consultant to review vertical and horizontal appropriateness; this was last carried out in 2022. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board also considers the requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code when determining and reviewing the remuneration of the Executive Board.

Any conflict of interest in the establishment, implementation and review of the remuneration policy shall be treated by the Supervisory Board in the same way as other conflicts of interest in the person of a Supervisory Board member. The Supervisory Board member concerned is therefore required to disclose any conflict of interest to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and will not participate in the adoption of resolutions or in the deliberations concerned. Disclosure of any conflicts of interest at an early stage ensures that the decisions of the Supervisory Board are not influenced by inappropriate considerations.

The current Executive Board members' employment contracts in the reporting year corresponded to the 2023 remuneration policy. However, they already provide for the application of the rules of the 2025 remuneration policy to remuneration granted for periods from the beginning of the current fiscal year. These rules were approved by the Annual General Meeting in 2025. The share-based component of long-term remuneration, which is still designed under the current Executive Board members' employment contracts as a combination of share-based remuneration and participation in the phantom stock plan, is excluded from the switch to the 2025 remuneration policy. For the time being, a switch in the share-based component of long-term remuneration to a purely share-based remuneration in accordance with the amended stipulations of the 2025 remuneration policy is planned only for new contracts.

VI. Compliance with the Maximum Remuneration Limits for the Executive Board

Executive Board remuneration is capped in two respects. Under the new remuneration policy, the total remuneration consisting of a fixed salary including fringe benefits, employee benefit expense, and the short-term and long-term variable remuneration components for a fiscal year – irrespective of whether it is paid in

the fiscal year in question or at another time – is limited to a maximum gross amount of €6 million for the Executive Board Chairman and €4 million for each of the other Executive Board members. The maximum remuneration covers the maximum possible non-performance-related fixed and performance-related variable remuneration components, including employee benefit expense. Benefits in kind granted as fringe benefits are recognized at their value for income tax purposes. Regarding share-based remuneration, the prorated grant value attributable to one year is recognized as part of the maximum remuneration.

For all current Executive Board members, the individual components of their remuneration are already structured so that the total remuneration granted to each respective Executive Board member for a fiscal year – regardless of whether it is paid in the fiscal year in question or at another time – does not exceed the maximum remuneration established in the new remuneration policy. For this purpose, a separate maximum amount is set for each of the variable remuneration components. This maximum amount is currently 150% of the target amount for short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis and for the component of long-term variable remuneration based on consolidated net profit, and 250% of the granted amount in the case of participation in the phantom stock program. For the purposes of calculating maximum remuneration, the share-based compensation is taken into account at the prorated grant value attributable to one year and thus at an amount fixed from the outset (see above).

The following table shows the maximum limits for the variable remuneration components and the shares granted. Compliance with the maximum limits for short-term variable remuneration and for the shares granted can be reviewed already for fiscal 2025. For multi-year variable remuneration, compliance with the maximum limits can only be reviewed retroactively as soon as these are vested or phantom stock units are exercised.

€ in K	Dr. Michael Grosse (from 01.07.2025)		Receipts	Dr. René Fáber		
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration		Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts
Short-term variable remuneration	450	675	492	550	825	621
Long-term variable remuneration	300	450		500	1,000	
Consolidated net profit 2025 (4 years)	150	225		125	188	
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity 2025 (4 years)	150	225		125	188	
Phantom stock plan 2025 (exercisable from 2028)	0	0		250	625	
Shares granted	900	900	900	300	300	300

€ in K	Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer		Receipts	Dr. Florian Funck		
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration		Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts
Short-term variable remuneration	450	675	427	525	788	574
Long-term variable remuneration	400	800		435	870	
Consolidated net profit 2025 (4 years)	100	150		109	163	
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity 2025 (4 years)	100	150		109	163	
Phantom stock plan 2025 (exercisable from 2028)	200	500		218	544	
Shares granted	300	300	300	300	300	300

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg (until 30.06.2025)		
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts
Short-term variable remuneration	551	827	602
Long-term variable remuneration	603	1,206	
Consolidated net profit 2025 (4 years)	151	226	
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity 2025 (4 years)	151	226	
Phantom stock plan 2025 (exercisable from 2028)	301	753	
Shares granted	1,000	1,000	1,000

The amount of the fixed remuneration components and the target and/or grant date amounts of the variable remuneration components for fiscal 2025 were selected for all Executive Board members so that even if the maximum amounts of the variable remuneration components were reached, the total gross amount of fixed and variable remuneration components of each Executive Board member would not exceed the highest sum defined by the maximum remuneration for this reporting year. The following table shows the maximum achievable amounts of the individual compensation components for 2025 and clearly shows that the maximum achievable compensation falls short of the defined maximum compensation of the Supervisory Board pursuant to Section 87a, Subsection 1, sentence 2, item no. 1 AktG.

€ in K	Dr. Michael Grosse (as of July 1.2025)	Dr. René Fáber	Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer	Dr. Florian Funck	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg (until June 30, 2025)
	Fixed remuneration	650	850	750	840
Fringe benefits	10	13	15	8	14
Total non-performance-based remuneration	660	863	765	848	927
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)	675	825	675	788	827
Short-term variable remuneration	675	825	675	788	827
Consolidated net profit (4 years)	225	188	150	163	226
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity 2025 (4 years)	225	188	150	163	226
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years)	0	625	500	544	754
Long-term variable remuneration	450	1,000	800	870	1,206
Shares granted	900	300	300	300	1,000
Post-employment benefits	0	137	0	0	166
Maximum achievable remuneration	2,685	3,125	2,540	2,806	4,126
Maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 87a para. 1 sent. 2 No. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act	6,000	4,000	4,000	4,000	6,000

The final review of compliance with the maximum remuneration for fiscal 2025 will be presented in the remuneration report for the fiscal year in which the last long-term remuneration component was vested and/or exercised. The regulation on maximum remuneration was introduced in 2022. Accordingly, information on compliance with maximum remuneration for 2022 or subsequent years will be provided when the last long-term remuneration component for the respective earlier fiscal year has been settled.

2. Remuneration of the Executive Board Members in the Reporting Year

Total remuneration granted and owed for the active service of all Executive Board members together amounted to €9,192 thousand in 2025 compared with €6,842 thousand in the previous year. The details of the individual remuneration components are described in the following.

Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Executive Board Pursuant to Section 162 AktG

The following table shows the remuneration granted and owed, pursuant to Section 162 AktG, to the current members of the Executive Board. Remuneration is deemed to be owed if it is due but has not yet been paid. In this case, remuneration granted is assumed already at the time service is performed and not only at the point in time of payment. The figures stated for variable remuneration components are the amounts "vested" in the respective fiscal year. In the case of share-based remuneration, the value at the time of transfer is reported.

€ in K	Dr. Michael Grosse (as of July 1, 2025)				Dr. René Fáber			
	2025	in %	2024	in %	2025	in %	2024	in %
Fixed remuneration	650	17%	0	0%	850	51%	750	38%
Fringe benefits	10	0%	0	0%	13	1%	13	1%
Total non-performance-based remuneration	660	17%	0	0%	863	52%	763	39%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year) ¹	492	13%	0	0%	621	37%	259	13%
Consolidated net profit (4 years) ²	0	0%	0	0%	76	5%	0	0%
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity (4 years) ²	0	0%	0		68	4%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ³	0	0%	0	0%	42	2%	46	2%
Shares granted	2,700	70%	0	0%	0	0%	900	46%
Performance-based remuneration	3,192	83%	0	0%	807	48%	1,205	61%
Total remuneration	3,852	100%	0	0%	1,670	100%	1,968	100%

€ in K	Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer				Dr. Florian Funck (as of April 1, 2024)			
	2025	in %	2024	in %	2025	in %	2024	in %
Fixed remuneration	750	63%	600	39%	840	59%	630	36%
Fringe benefits	15	1%	15	1%	8	1%	6	0%
Total non-performance-based remuneration	765	64%	615	40%	848	60%	636	36%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year) ¹	427	36%	215	14%	574	40%	227	13%
Consolidated net profit (4 years) ²	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity (4 years) ²	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ³	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Shares granted	0	0%	700	46%	0	0%	900	51%
Performance-based remuneration	427	36%	915	60%	574	40%	1,127	64%
Total remuneration	1,192	100%	1,530	100%	1,422	100%	1,763	100%

1 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement.

2 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement of the plan in which a fiscal year ended, i.e. for 2025: 2022- 2025.

3 Fair value at the time the exercise conditions are met.

Remuneration Granted and Owed to Former Executive Board Members

The following tables show the remuneration granted and owed, pursuant to Section 162 AktG, to former members of the Executive Board. For former Executive Board members who have left the company within the last ten years, information is disclosed by name. For members who left prior to that, only a combined, anonymized figure under "Other" is shown in accordance with Section 162, Subsection 5, sentence 2 AktG.

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg (until June 30, 2025) ¹			
	2025	in %	2024	in %
Fixed remuneration	913	39%	1,060	67%
Fringe benefits	14	1%	15	1%
Total non-performance-based remuneration	927	40%	1,075	68%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year) ²	602	26%	369	23%
Consolidated net profit (4 years) ³	118	5%	0	0%
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity (4 years) ³	106	5%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ⁴	64	3%	137	9%
Shares granted	0	0%	0	0%
Performance-based remuneration	890	38%	506	32%
Compensation payment phantom stock plan 2025 ⁵	301	13%	0	0%
Compensation for non-competition period ⁶	223	10%	0	0%
Remuneration under the settlement agreement	524	22%	0	0%
Total remuneration	2,341	100%	1,581	100%

€ in K	Rainer Lehmann (until Oct. 31, 2023)				John Gerard Mackay (until June 15, 2023)			
	2025	in %	2024	in %	2025	in %	2024	in %
Fixed remuneration	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Fringe benefits	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total non-performance-based remuneration	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year) ²	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Consolidated net profit (4 years) ³	73	41%	0	0%	76	41%	0	0%
Reduction of CO ₂ eq emission intensity (4 years) ³	66	37%	0	0%	68	37%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ⁴	40	22%	81	100%	42	22%	46	100%
Shares granted	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Performance-based remuneration	179	100%	81	100%	186	100%	46	100%
Total remuneration	179	100%	81	100%	186	100%	46	100%

1 Dr. Kreuzburg resigned from his position on June 30, 2025, but remained available to Sartorius in an advisory capacity until his employment contract expired on November 10, 2025. Until November 10, Dr. Kreuzburg continued to receive the remuneration components agreed in his previous employment contract, which are included in the performance-based and non-performance-based remuneration.

2 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement.

3 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement of the plan in which a fiscal year ended, i.e. for 2025: 2022-2025.

4 Fair value at the time the exercise conditions are met.

5 For fiscal year 2025, Dr. Kreuzburg received a compensation payment of equal value, as no further virtual shares were issued under the phantom stock plan for 2025.

6 Starting from November 11, 2025, Dr. Kreuzburg is receiving compensation for the agreed post-contractual non-competition period in the amount of €3.2 million paid out over two years.

€ in K	2025	Other 2024
Pension	397	530
Total remuneration	397	530

3. Disclosures on Share-Based Remuneration | Phantom Stock Units

	Number of phantom stock units	Price on assign- ment in €	Fair value when granted on Jan. 1 of the particular year € in K	Fair value at year- end on Dec. 31, 2024 € in K	Fair value at year- end on Dec. 31, 2025 € in K	Paid in fiscal 2025 € in K	Change in value in fiscal 2025 € in K	Status
Dr. René Fáber								
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	124	143	0	18	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	46	51	0	5	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2022	365	574.61	210	42	42	0	0	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2023	737	356.09	262	114	132	0	18	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2024	626	319.43	200	106	124	0	19	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	2,617		892	432	492	0	60	
Tranche for fiscal 2025	1,139	219.41	250	0	257	0	7	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	3,756		1,142	432	749	0	68	
Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer (as of May 1, 2023)								
Tranche for fiscal 2023	393	356.09	140	61	70	0	10	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2024	564	319.43	180	95	112	0	17	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	957		320	156	182	0	27	
Tranche for fiscal 2025	912	219.41	200	0	206	0	6	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	1,869		520	156	388	0	33	
Dr. Florian Funck (as of April 1, 2024)								
Tranche for fiscal 2024	511	319.43	163	86	101	0	15	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	511		163	86	101	0	15	
Tranche for fiscal 2025	991	219.41	217	0	224	0	7	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	1,502		380	86	325	0	22	

Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg									
Tranche for fiscal 2020	1,240	190.30	236	267	307	0	40	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	918	354.13	325	137	151	0	15	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	566	574.61	325	65	64	0	0	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2023	983	356.09	350	151	176	0	25	Not exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2024	1,096	319.43	350	185	218	0	33	Not exercisable	
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	4,803		1,586	805	916	0	111		

Rainer Lehmann (until Oct. 31, 2023)									
Tranche for fiscal 2020	936	190.30	178	201	231	0	30	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	544	354.13	193	81	90	0	9	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	350	574.61	201	40	40	0	0	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2023	573	356.09	204	88	103	0	14	Not exercisable	
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	2,403		776	411	464	0	53		

John Gerard Mackay (until June 15, 2023)									
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	124	0	147	23	paid out	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	46	51	0	5	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	365	574.61	210	42	42	0	0	exercisable	
Tranche for fiscal 2023	688	356.09	245	106	123	0	17	Not exercisable	
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	1,942		675	319	216	147	44		

4. Pension Commitments

The projected pension payments, the present value of pension obligations and the service cost are shown in the following table:

€ in K	Projected pension payment p.a.	Present value of the obligation (IFRS)		Service cost (IFRS)	
		Dec. 31, 2025	Dec. 31, 2024	2025	2024
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	294	5,178	4,815	0	121
Dr. René Fáber	89	919	468	0	0
	383	6,097	5,283	0	121

In addition, a pension contribution of €166 thousand (2024: €169 thousand) was paid for Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg in 2025 and a pension contribution of €137 thousand (2024: €112 thousand) for Dr. René Fáber.

5. Comparative Table

€ in K	2025	in %	2024	in %	2023	in %	2022	in %	2021
Managing Board Members									
Dr. Michael Grosse (as of July 1, 2025)	3,852								
Dr. René Fáber	1,670	-15%	1,968	117%	906	-14%	1,058	19%	890
Dr. Alexandra Gatzemeyer (as of May 1, 2023)	1,192	-22%	1,530	306%	377		0		0
Dr. Florian Funck (as of April 1, 2024)	1,422	-19%	1,763		0		0		0
Former Managing Board Members									
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg (until June 30, 2025)	2,341	48%	1,581	-11%	1,783	-22%	2,290	-11%	2,585
Rainer Lehmann (until Oct. 31, 2023)	179	121%	81	-92%	1,055	-17%	1,272	-1%	1,285
John Gerard Mackay (until June 15, 2023)	186	303%	46	-94%	768	-40%	1,281	29%	990
Other	397	-25%	530	0%	528	0%	526	2%	517
Earnings Development									
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,052	11%	945	-2%	963	20%	1,410	20%	1,175
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	126	307%	31	-73%	115	278%	155	278%	41
Average Remuneration of Employees									
Group Employees in Germany	100	3%	97	8%	90	-4%	85	-4%	89

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. In addition to wages and salaries, average remuneration also includes social security contributions and pension expenses. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

6. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Supervisory Board

The remuneration for Supervisory Board members is defined in the Articles of Association of Sartorius AG and comprises fixed remuneration, meeting attendance fees, and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Members serving as chairperson and vice chairperson of the Supervisory Board receive higher fixed remuneration.

Members and chairpersons of Supervisory Board committees, except for those of Nomination Committee or the committee pursuant to Section 27, Subsection 3, of the German Codetermination Act ("MitBestG"), are entitled to receive additional annual fixed amounts and meeting attendance fees as well as reimbursement of their out-of-pocket expenses.

In addition, the members of the Supervisory Board are included in a directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance policy taken out by the company, the premiums for which are paid by Sartorius Aktiengesellschaft. This D&O insurance policy covers the legal liability arising from Supervisory Board activities and is taken out at standard market terms and conditions.

In line with prevailing market practice at listed companies in Germany, the remuneration of Supervisory Board members is strictly fixed compensation along with meeting attendance fees and does not include any performance-related components. The Executive Board and Supervisory Board are of the opinion that strictly fixed remuneration for Supervisory Board members is best suited to strengthening the independence of the Supervisory Board and fulfilling the latter's advisory and supervisory functions, which are to be performed independently of the company's success. The amount and structure of Supervisory Board remuneration ensure that the company is able to attract qualified candidates for membership in the company's Supervisory Board; in this way, Supervisory Board remuneration helps sustainably promote the business strategy and the long-term development of the company. The existing remuneration policy especially takes into account Recommendation G.17 and the Suggestion G.18, sentence 1, of the German Corporate Governance Code in the current version as amended.

7. Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2025		2024	
Remuneration for the Supervisory Board Members				
Total remuneration	1,463	100%	1,487	100%
Fixed remuneration	988	68%	994	67%
Compensation for committee work	250	17%	250	17%
Meeting attendance fee	225	15%	243	16%

€ in K	2025		2024	
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)				
Total remuneration	290	100%	284	100%
Fixed remuneration	175	60%	175	62%
Compensation for committee work	70	24%	70	25%
Meeting attendance fee	45	16%	39	14%

€ in K	2025		2024	
Dietmar Müller (Vice Chairman as of April 1, 2025)¹				
Total remuneration	170	100%	118	100%
Fixed remuneration	107	63%	70	59%
Compensation for committee work	45	26%	30	25%
Meeting attendance fee	18	11%	18	15%

€ in K	2025		2024	
Annette Becker¹				
Total remuneration	105	100%	117	100%
Fixed remuneration	70	67%	70	60%
Compensation for committee work	20	19%	20	17%
Meeting attendance fee	15	14%	27	23%

€ in K	2025		2024	
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.				
Total remuneration	79	100%	79	100%
Fixed remuneration	70	89%	70	89%
Meeting attendance fee	9	11%	9	11%

€ in K	2025		2024	
Dr. Daniela Favocchia				
Total remuneration	103	100%	85	100%
Fixed remuneration	70	68%	70	82%
Meeting attendance fee	33	32%	15	18%

€ in K	2025		2024		
Beatrix Henseler (as of Sep. 9, 2025)					
Total remuneration	26	100%	0	0%	
Fixed remuneration	23	88%		0%	
Meeting attendance fee	3	12%		0%	
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Dominik Langosch (as of April 2, 2025)¹					
Total remuneration	87	100%	0	0%	
Fixed remuneration	53	61%			0%
Compensation for committee work	23	26%			0%
Meeting attendance fee	11	13%			0%
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Ilke Hildegard Panzer					
Total remuneration	79	100%	82	100%	
Fixed remuneration	70	89%	70	85%	
Meeting attendance fee	9	11%	12	15%	
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Frank Riemensperger					
Total remuneration	79	100%	82	100%	
Fixed remuneration	70	89%	70	85%	
Meeting attendance fee	9	11%	12	15%	
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Hermann Jens Ritzau¹					
Total remuneration	79	100%	82	100%	
Fixed remuneration	70	89%	70	85%	
Meeting attendance fee	9	11%	12	15%	
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher					
Total remuneration	195	100%	189	100%	
Fixed remuneration	70	36%	70	37%	
Compensation for committee work	80	41%	80	42%	
Meeting attendance fee	45	23%	39	21%	
€ in K					
		2025		2024	
Sabrina Wirth¹					
Total remuneration	75	100%	82	100%	
Fixed remuneration	70	93%	70	85%	
Meeting attendance fee	5	7%	12	15%	

€ in K	2025		2024	
Petra Kirchhoff (until July 31, 2025)				
Total remuneration	47	100%	82	100%
Fixed remuneration	41	87%	70	85%
Meeting attendance fee	6	13%	12	15%
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman) until March 31, 2025¹				
Total remuneration	49	100%	202	100%
Fixed remuneration	29	59%	119	59%
Compensation for committee work	12	24%	50	25%
Meeting attendance fee	8	16%	33	16%

¹The employee representatives declared that they donate their Supervisory Board remuneration to the foundation Hans-Böckler-Stiftung according to the guidelines of the German Trade Union Association

In addition to their Supervisory Board remuneration, the Supervisory Board members who are employees of the Sartorius Group receive compensation that is not related to their service on the Supervisory Board.

8. Comparative Table

€ in K	2025	in %	2024	in %	2023	in %	2022	in %	2021
Supervisory Board Members									
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)	290	2%	284	1%	281	10%	256	-2%	261
Dietmar Müller (Vice Chairman as of April 1, 2025)	170	44%	118	0%	118	57%	75	0%	75
Annette Becker	105	-10%	117	-3%	120	76%	68	-3%	70
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.	79	-4%	82	0%	82	52%	54	-5%	57
Dr. Daniela Favocchia	103	21%	85	4%	82	52%	54	-5%	57
Beatrix Henseler (as of Sep. 9, 2025)	26		0		0		0		0
Dominik Langosch (as of April 2, 2025)	87		0		0		0		0
Ilke Hildegard Panzer	79	-4%	82	0%	82	52%	54	-5%	57
Frank Riemensperger (as of March 25, 2022)	79	-4%	82	1%	81	88%	43		0
Hermann Jens Ritzau (as of Mar. 1, 2021)	79	-4%	82	0%	82	52%	54	10%	49
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher	195	3%	189	2%	186	79%	104	-4%	108
Sabrina Wirth (as of March 25, 2022)	75	-9%	82	1%	81	88%	43		0
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman until March 31, 2025)	49	-76%	202	0%	201	50%	134	-2%	137
Petra Kirchoff (until July 31, 2025)	47	-43%	82	0%	82	52%	54	-5%	57
Earnings Development									
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,052	11%	945	-2%	963	-32%	1,410	20%	1,175
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	126	302%	31	-73%	115	-26%	155	277%	41
Average Remuneration of Employees									
Group Employees in Germany	100	3%	97	8%	90	6%	85	-4%	89

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. In addition to wages and salaries, average remuneration also includes social security contributions and pension expenses. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

9. Requirements pursuant to Section 162, Subsection 1, Sentence 2, No. 6 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)

The Annual General Meeting approved the Remuneration Report for fiscal 2024 at the Annual General Meeting on March 27, 2025 with 98.69% of the votes cast. Due to the high approval rate, the structure of the Remuneration Report was retained.

Report of the Independent Auditor

To Sartorius AG, Göttingen

We have audited the remuneration report of Sartorius AG, Göttingen, for the financial year from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025 including the related disclosures, which was prepared to comply with § [Article] 162 AktG [Aktiengesetz: German Stock Corporation Act].

Responsibilities of the Executive Directors and the Supervisory Board

The executive directors and the supervisory board of Sartorius AG are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that complies with the requirements of § 162 AktG. The executive directors and the supervisory board are also responsible for such internal control as they determine is necessary to enable the preparation of a remuneration report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatement, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor's Responsibilities

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on this remuneration report, including the related disclosures, based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with German generally accepted standards for the audit of financial statements promulgated by the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer (Institute of Public Auditors in Germany) (IDW). Those standards require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the remuneration report, including the related disclosures, is free from material misstatement.

An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts including the related disclosures stated in the remuneration report. The procedures selected depend on the auditor's judgment. This includes the assessment of the risks of material misstatement of the remuneration report including the related disclosures, whether due to fraud or error.

In making those risk assessments, the auditor considers internal control relevant to the preparation of the remuneration report including the related disclosures. The objective of this is to plan and perform audit procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the company's internal control. An audit also includes evaluating the appropriateness of accounting policies used and the reasonableness of accounting estimates made by the executive directors and the supervisory board, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the remuneration report including the related disclosures.

We believe that the audit evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our audit opinion.

Audit Opinion

In our opinion, based on the findings of our audit, the remuneration report for the financial year from January 1, 2025 to December 31, 2025, including the related disclosures, complies in all material respects with the accounting provisions of § 162 AktG.

Reference to an Other Matter – Formal Audit of the Remuneration Report according to § 162 AktG

The audit of the content of the remuneration report described in this auditor's report includes the formal audit of the remuneration report required by § 162 Abs. [paragraph] 3 AktG, including the issuance of a report on this audit. As we express an unqualified audit opinion on the content of the remuneration report, this audit opinion includes that the information required by § 162 Abs. 1 and 2 AktG has been disclosed in all material respects in the remuneration report.

Restriction on use

We issue this auditor's report on the basis of the engagement agreed with Sartorius AG. The audit has been performed only for purposes of the company and the auditor's report is solely intended to inform the company as to the results of the audit. Our responsibility for the audit and for our auditor's report is only towards the company in accordance with this engagement. The auditor's report is not intended for any third parties to base any (financial) decisions thereon. We do not assume any responsibility, duty of care or liability towards third parties; no third parties are included in the scope of protection of the underlying engagement. § 334 BGB [Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: German Civil Code], according to which objections arising from a contract may also be raised against third parties, is not waived.

Hanover, February 6, 2026

PricewaterhouseCoopers GmbH
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Dr. Thomas Ull

Wirtschaftsprüfer

(German Public Auditor)

ppa. Lasse Neubert

Wirtschaftsprüfer

(German Public Auditor)