

Sartorius Group

# Remuneration Report

Extract from the Annual Report 2021

# Remuneration Report

## 1. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Executive Board

### A. Main Features of the Remuneration Policy and Contribution Toward Promoting the Corporate Strategy and Long-Term Development of the Company

The remuneration policy for the Executive Board aims to remunerate the members of the Executive Board appropriately in line with their tasks and responsibilities and to directly consider the performance of each member of the Executive Board and the success of the company. Accordingly, the remuneration policy includes fixed remuneration components as well as short- and long-term variable remuneration components.

The company strategy seeks to achieve profitable growth and a sustained, long-term increase in the value of the company. This strategy is the basis from which the structure of the remuneration policy is derived for the Executive Board of Sartorius AG: The short-term variable remuneration depends on annual corporate targets that are aligned with key performance indicators for profitable growth of the company. Long-term remuneration depends on a corporate goal that reflects the sustainable and long-term growth of the company and the Group, on the one hand, and on the long-term performance of the share price, which directly mirrors the development of the company's value, on the other. As a result, the company's remuneration policy creates incentives to promote the long-term and positive sustainable development of the company.

The policy for remuneration of the Executive Board members is designed to be simple, clear and understandable. This system meets the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Law ("Aktiengesetz," abbreviated as "AktG") as well as the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code (abbreviated as "GCGC") with the exception of any divergences explained in the Declaration of Compliance with the Recommendations of the GCGC as amended from time to time. The existing divergences in the reporting year from the recommendations of the applicable GCGC in the area of remuneration are given below.

### B. Details of the Remuneration Policy

#### I. Remuneration Components

##### 1. Overview of the Individual Remuneration Components

Remuneration consists of fixed and variable components. The fixed components are the fixed annual salary and fringe benefits. The variable performance-based components are comprised of short-term components with a one-year assessment basis and of long-term components with a multi-year assessment basis. In addition, there are pension commitments, which depend, among other things, on the amount of the own contribution made by the respective Executive Board member in the form of deferred compensation for variable remuneration components, and which are therefore also variable.

##### 2. Fixed Remuneration Components

###### a) Fixed Annual Remuneration

Fixed annual remuneration is cash compensation related to a specific fiscal year, and is based in particular on the area of duties and responsibilities of the respective Executive Board member. This fixed annual remuneration is paid in twelve monthly installments.

## b) Fringe Benefits

Beyond the remuneration components stated above, the members of the Executive Board receive the following fringe benefits: each member is entitled to use a company car that can also be utilized for private purposes and to be covered by accident insurance taken out in the respective Executive Board member's name as a beneficiary. Moreover, for Executive Board members residing outside Germany, Rainer Lehmann und John Gerard Mackay, the costs for taking flights home and running two households as well as the costs associated with said activities are also paid by the company as fringe benefits.

Furthermore, the company maintains a D&O insurance policy concluded for Executive Board members as beneficiaries. The respective insurance premiums are not of a remunerative nature and are therefore not recognized as salary expenses.

## 3. Variable Performance-Based Remuneration Components

### a) Short-Term Variable Remuneration with a One-Year Assessment Basis

In addition to the fixed remuneration components, all Executive Board members are entitled to receive short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis.

#### Target Parameters

Short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis consists of three individual components related to the subordinate financial targets of sales revenue | order intake, underlying EBITDA, and the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA.

These subordinate financial targets are essential control elements for profitable growth as well as for a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company and thus serve to implement the company's overall strategic objectives. There are no non-financial target parameters.

#### Measurement of Target Achievement and Payment

For each target parameter, the Supervisory Board has defined a formula that is used to calculate the amount to be paid out according to the degree of target achievement for the associated individual component. For each of these components, the Supervisory Board also sets (i) a minimum target to be achieved below which the amount that will be paid out is zero, and (ii) a maximum target to be achieved above which the amount that will be paid out will no longer increase. Therefore, the amount paid out for each subordinate target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap is currently 120% for all subordinate targets.

For each of the individual components of short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis, the Supervisory Board sets a separate individual target amount for every Executive Board member before the beginning of a fiscal year. This target amount is used as the basis to determine the specific amount to be paid out according to the particular target achievement of the relevant subordinate target for the fiscal year in question. The targets are weighted for the individual Executive Board members according to their area of responsibility and relate to the divisions and/or to the Group, respectively.

The Supervisory Board derives each target value of the subordinate financial targets from the approved annual budget for a respective fiscal year and determines the degree of target achievement by comparison with the actual result yielded in the company's consolidated financial statements audited and approved for this respective financial year. In calculating these target values, the Supervisory Board can adjust the actual amounts reported in the consolidated statements to allow for non-recurring, unusual and/or non-operating items.

Annual short-term variable remuneration is calculated for a fiscal year ended and paid in the following fiscal year.

The subordinate targets within the short-term variable remuneration are weighted for the Executive Board members as follows:

Subordinate Target	Executive Board Chairman   Chief Financial Officer	Executive Board Members with Division Responsibility
Related to the Sartorius Group		
Average calculated from sales revenue   order intake	30%	9%
Underlying EBITDA	40%	12%
Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA	30%	9%
Related to the particular division		
Average calculated from sales revenue   order intake	--	30%
Underlying EBITDA	--	40%

#### Subordinate Target “Average Calculated from Sales Revenue | Order Intake”

The subordinate target “average calculated from sales revenue | order intake” is a key performance indicator of growth and is derived from the budget for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 90% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 104%. If 90% of the target amount is achieved, 50% of the associated individual target sum will be paid out; if the target is achieved at less than 90%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. If 104% of the target amount is achieved, an amount equal to 120% of the corresponding individual target amount will be paid out; if the target is achieved in excess of this percentage, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Intermediate values are interpolated linearly. Target achievement is measured on the basis of actual sales and order intake in constant currencies, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for the amounts contributed by businesses acquired or divested during the respective reporting year to the extent that such businesses are not part of the target amount. Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

Due to the dynamic business performance in 2021, the Group as well as both the Bioprocess Solutions Division and the Lab Products & Services Division achieved amounts for the subordinate target “average calculated from sales revenue | order intake” that exceeded the defined targets of 104%. As a result, each Executive Board member will be paid 120% of the individual target amount for this subordinate target.

#### Subordinate Target “Underlying EBITDA”

The subordinate target “underlying EBITDA” is a key profitability indicator of the Group. This indicator is used to provide a picture of the Group's operating development that is also internationally better comparable. Underlying EBITDA stands for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization and adjusted for extraordinary items. The target is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 70% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 120%. The level of the bonus payment is linear to the level of target achievement; i.e., if 70% of the subordinate target is achieved, 70% of the related individual target amount will be paid out, or if 120% of the target is achieved, 120% of the related individual target amount will be paid out. If the target is achieved at less than 70%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. By contrast, if the target is achieved by 120% or more, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual underlying EBITDA figure, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as by taking into

account current exchange rates. Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

In fiscal 2021, target achievement for the subordinate target “underlying EBITDA” exceeded 120% of the target value for the Group as well as for both divisions so that each Executive Board member will be paid an amount of 120% of the individual target amount for this subordinate target.

#### **Subordinate Target “Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA”**

The subordinate target “ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA” is a key financial ratio regarding the Group’s debt financing capacity. This ratio is calculated as the quotient of net debt and underlying EBITDA. It is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group. The level of the bonus paid is between 50% and 120% of the respective subordinate target amount. If the target ratio is reached, the bonus level to be paid is 100%. If net debt to underlying EBITDA is above the target ratio, the bonus level will decrease proportionately down to 50% if the maximum amount defined by the Supervisory Board for the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA is reached. If the ratio exceeds this maximum amount, no bonus will be paid for this subordinate target. By contrast, if net debt to underlying EBITDA is below the target ratio, the bonus amount is capped at 120%, with the associated ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA derived mathematically on a linear proportional basis from the maximum and target values for this ratio as defined by the Supervisory Board. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA in constant currencies, as reported in the company’s consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for inflows and outflows entailed by strategic (capital) measures, such as acquisitions, provided that such inflows and outflows are not included in the target ratio. Moreover, in individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amounts to allow for non-recurring, unusual circumstances.

In fiscal 2021, target achievement for the subordinate target “ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA” was significantly below the ratio defined as the target and an amount will be paid out accordingly for this subordinate target.

#### **b) Long-Term Variable Remuneration Components**

In the reporting year, the long-term variable remuneration components for all Executive Board members first consisted of the following two individual components: One individual component is related to the development of the consolidated net profit in a three-year assessment period as a target parameter; the other, to the price development of Sartorius AG preference shares in an assessment period of (at least) four years. As a result, the long-term variable remuneration components are also aligned with financial target parameters that measure profitable growth and a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company, and thus serves to implement the company’s overarching strategic objectives. Non-financial target parameters are currently not provided for the long-term variable remuneration components either.

Regarding its three-year assessment basis, the individual component of the consolidated net profit granted as long-term variable remuneration in the reporting year of 2021 does not yet correspond to the Executive Board remuneration policy approved by the Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting on March 26, 2021, pursuant to Section 120a, Subsection 1, of AktG. The new remuneration policy provides for a four-year assessment basis in line with Recommendation G.10, sentence 2, of GCGC and, as a result of the respective new remuneration arrangements from 2022 onwards, this individual component will be paid to all current members of the Executive Board except to Mr. Rainer Lehmann. For Mr. Rainer Lehmann, the three-year assessment basis will still apply up to the end of his current appointment, i.e., until February 28, 2025. Insofar as a three-year assessment basis is still applied in the reporting year or beyond, this is therefore based on remuneration provisions in Executive Board contracts concluded before Recommendation G.10 of GCGC entered into force.

The two previously mentioned long-term variable remuneration components are each weighted at 50%. For each of both individual components, a separate individual target amount is defined for every Executive Board

member. This target is used as the basis for calculating the specific bonus amount to be paid out based on the degree of achievement of the associated targets defined for the respective fiscal years.

The Executive Board Chairman Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based compensation as a further long-term variable remuneration component. The long-term increase in the value of the company as an overriding strategic objective of the company is also promoted by this share-based compensation and participation provided by this in the development of the price of the company's shares. The respective long-term variable remuneration components together generally represent the majority of the variable compensation components for each Executive Board member. Something different from this arrangement applied in the reporting year of 2021 to Executive Board members Dr. René Fáber and John Gerard Mackay for whom the long-term components accounted for half of their variable remuneration in total. However, in this case as well, their long-term variable remuneration components together will constitute the majority of their variable remuneration as of 2022 due to the new remuneration arrangements meanwhile approved.

Because of the equal weighting of the two components of long-term variable remuneration related to consolidated net profit and the performance of the preference share price, the share-based portion of variable remuneration does not represent, in principle, the predominant portion of the variable remuneration of the members of the Executive Board, in divergence from Recommendation G.10, sentence 1, of GCGC. The Supervisory Board believes that even with the current weighting, an incentive structure is achieved which is geared to the sustainable and long-term development of the company. In the case of the Chairman of the Executive Board, however, his variable remuneration is predominantly share-based in view of the additional share bonus granted, in line with this Recommendation.

### Consolidated Net Profit

The individual component related to consolidated net profit has an assessment period of three consecutive fiscal years and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche concerned is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The amount paid out for a particular tranche depends on the total target achievement for the respective assessment period, which corresponds to the average target achievement for each of the three fiscal years of the relevant assessment period. For each fiscal year, the Supervisory Board annually defines a target for consolidated net profit in euros. To determine the level of target achievement for a fiscal year, the consolidated net profit (up to and including the 2020 amount granted, after deduction of non-controlling interest) that is reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved and excludes amortization (impairment of the value of intangible assets due to business combinations pursuant to IFRS 3) is compared with the respective target set by the Supervisory Board. In individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make further adjustments to the actual amount to allow for non-recurring, unusual items and/or non-operating items.

This remuneration component is calculated according to the individual target amount and a formula defined by the Supervisory Board. This formula provides for (i) a minimum target to be achieved below which the amount that will be paid out is zero, and (ii) a maximum target to be achieved above which the amount that will be paid out will no longer increase. Therefore, the amount paid out for this remuneration target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap is currently 120% for all individual target amounts and is reached at a target achievement level of 120%. This remuneration component is generally paid out upon expiration of the last fiscal year in the respective period of assessment for the tranche concerned. The period of assessment for granting such bonus amounts in the reporting year and for the previous years was three years, but according to the new remuneration policy, is to be converted to a four-year period in the future.

However, to smooth the amounts to be paid out, a partial payment amounting to 50% of the target achievement for the first fiscal year of each respective average period of assessment for a tranche is effected based on the individual subordinate target. Such a partial amount is calculated and paid out at the end of the first fiscal year of a respective assessment period based on the company's consolidated financial statements

audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved. Any overpayments as a result of these partial payments will be offset against other remuneration components once the total target achievement has been determined after the third fiscal year of the relevant assessment period.

The target achievement in fiscal 2021 for the "consolidated net profit" component was above 120% of the target. For the target achievement in the multi-year period of 2019 to 2021, target achievement also exceeds the cap of 120% and, therefore, a payout of 120% less the partial payment granted in 2019 will apply to this three-year period. The complete target achievement for the multi-year assessment period beginning in 2021 cannot be determined until the consolidated financial statements audited and approved for 2023 are available.

### Development of the Preference Share Price (Phantom Stock Plan)

Executive Board members receive virtual shares, so-called phantom stock units, as a second individual component of long-term variable remuneration. Through the issue of such shadow shares, Executive Board members are treated as if they were owners of a certain number of preference shares in Sartorius AG, without, however, being entitled to receive dividends. The development of the value of this phantom stock is linked with the development of the Sartorius preference share; both increases and decreases in the share price are taken into account. Later, the value of this phantom stock is assessed based on the share price at the time, and its equivalent is paid out in cash, provided that the associated conditions are met. Phantom stock cannot be traded and does not entail any share subscription rights.

According to the Sartorius phantom stock plan, each Executive Board member is credited at the beginning of every year with phantom stock units valued at an agreed monetary sum. The value of this phantom stock can be paid out only as an entire annual tranche. Payment can be requested at the earliest after a period of four years and no later than after eight years. If a member's appointment term begins during a year, this member will be assigned phantom stock units retroactively as of the beginning of this fiscal year (pro rata temporis, if applicable).

An Executive Board member is entitled to receive payment for phantom stock units only if the share price at the time of such payment request has appreciated at least 7.5% per year relative to the time the phantom stock was assigned or if the share price outperformed the TecDAX as a comparative index. In addition, the value of the phantom stock units must be at least 50% of the grant value. The phantom stock plan rules out subsequent changes to the parameters used for comparative stock valuation.

Assignment of this phantom stock and later payment of its monetary equivalent depend on the mean value calculated from the average prices of the Sartorius AG preference share, with said prices quoted in the closing auction of Xetra trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (or a corresponding successor trading system) over the last 20 days of trading of the previous year (in the case of assignment) or over the last 20 days of trading prior to submission of a payment request (in the case of payment). This serves to compensate for any short-term fluctuations in the share prices.

The amount to be paid is capped at a maximum of 2.5 times the share price at the time the phantom stock was assigned, based in each case on the individual annual tranche.

Under the current terms of the phantom stock plan, payment for phantom stock is blocked for the four weeks preceding the scheduled publication date of quarterly results and for the 30 calendar days before the scheduled publication of the half-year results and preliminary year-end results, as well as for 20 days of trading on the stock exchange following the actual publication of quarterly and preliminary year-end results. These black-out periods are intended to ensure that payments are only made during periods in which the most recent business results have already been processed in the capital market and the regular publication of further business results is still sufficiently far in the future.

The fair value grant price for this remuneration component is €354.13 for 2021. Target achievement for this subordinate target is reported in the remuneration report after vesting or exercise by the Executive Board members; i.e., between 2025 and 2029.

### Share-Based Payment

In December 2019, Executive Board Chairman Dr. Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based payment in connection with the fourth extension of his appointment as a member and Chairman of the Executive Board as well as CEO. This was in the form of company shares with a grant date fair value totaling €5.0 million (based on the share price as of December 5, 2019, as the grant date); this corresponds to a proportional grant date fair value of €1.0 million for each year of his new five-year term of appointment. For this purpose, a corresponding number of treasury shares (27,570 own shares in total), consisting of equal proportions of own preference shares and own ordinary shares, were transferred to Dr. Kreuzburg at the beginning of his new term in November 2020. The shares granted are subject to a holding period that will end on November 10, 2024. Should Dr. Kreuzburg leave the company prior to November 11, 2022, at his own request, his entitlements to be granted said shares by transfer shall lapse in their entirety. If Dr. Kreuzburg leaves the company after November 10, 2022, and before November 11, 2024, at his own request, half of his entitlements to be granted said shares shall lapse. For the purpose of the target total remuneration, the shares granted for Dr. Kreuzburg's current five-year term of appointment are recognized at their pro-rated grant date fair value for each year of his term of appointment.

## 4. Pension Commitments

The members of the Executive Board generally receive pension commitments as defined-benefit plans for their first reappointment. At the request of the Executive Board member concerned, the company will take out an insurance policy for the term of his employment contract and pay the particular benefit contributions into this insurance. Each benefit contribution consists of a basic amount between 10% and 14% (as of 2022 the same rate of 14% for all Executive Board members) of the particular member's annual fixed remuneration. On request, the particular Executive Board member concerned can additionally pay in, as a personal benefit contribution by way of deferred compensation, a partial sum of between 5% and 7% maximum (as of 2022 the same rate of 7% for all Executive Board members) out of the gross amount paid to this Executive Board member in the respective fiscal year as short-term variable compensation and as long-term variable compensation based on net profit. If a member of the Executive Board exercises this right, the company on its part will make an additional contribution in the same amount (matching benefit contribution). In divergence from this arrangement and from the requirements of the new remuneration policy, Executive Board member John Gerard Mackay will receive, for the last time for fiscal 2021, a basic amount of 9.5% of the sum of his annual fixed remuneration – reduced by a supplementary amount for fixed remuneration, which was originally agreed as an allowance for a company car (so-called "car allowance") – and the target amount of his annual variable remuneration; accordingly, the option for deferred compensation and matching benefit contribution does not apply to him. For the purpose of determining the target total compensation and the relative share of the pension commitments in a member's target total remuneration, only the basic amount to be paid by the company and the matching benefit contribution were taken into account (based on 100% target achievement of the relevant variable remuneration components).

Pursuant to the insurance terms and conditions, the pension benefit can be granted in the form of a retirement pension or a lump-sum payment for reaching the regular retirement age or needing to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of surviving dependents' benefits for widows and orphans, according to which particular option an Executive Board member elects. The company does not guarantee the paid-in capital or an annual interest rate.

Furthermore, an earlier pension agreement granted to Dr. Kreuzburg provides that he will receive a monthly pension dependent on the basic salary of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz") in the respective version applicable. With each full year of service on the Executive Board, 5% of his full pension will be vested until his fully vested pension will have been reached after 20 years. In this case, these retirement benefits will have been fully vested, taking his years of service on the Executive Board into account, at the end of December 31, 2021. His retirement benefits will be granted in the form of a pension in the cases where he reaches the regular retirement age or needs to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of a pension for widows and orphans and shall correspond to 70% of the monthly pension benefits of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz"). These additional pension commitments are considered in the determination of Dr. Kreuzburg's target total remuneration and of the relative proportion of his pension commitments in his target total remuneration along with the respective employee benefit expense attributable thereto.

The regular retirement age for all pension commitments is 65. There are no early retirement regulations, except in the case of disability.

## 5. Other Remuneration Components

The remuneration policy provides that the Supervisory Board may grant special compensation at its reasonable discretion for extraordinary performance by a member of the Executive Board. The Supervisory Board exercised this right due to extraordinary performance in the reporting year of 2021 and paid a special bonus of €45,000 to each member of the Executive Board.

## II. Target Total Remuneration; Relative Percentages of Fixed and Variable Remuneration Components

The Supervisory Board determines a specific target total remuneration for each Executive Board member. The target total remuneration is the sum of all remuneration components relevant for total remuneration. For the variable components, the target amount is taken as a basis in each case of 100% target achievement, provided that a target is measured. In the case of share-based compensation, which is granted as an additional variable remuneration component only to the Executive Board Chairman, the pro-rated grant date fair value (= €1.0 million annually) is recognized for each year of the Chairman's associated contract term to ensure transparent and traceable reporting for the purposes of target total remuneration. Regarding pension commitments, it is further assumed that the Executive Board members will exercise their right to receive deferred compensation of their variable remuneration components (based on 100% achievement of targets) to the maximum extent permitted and that the company will therefore also pay each member a corresponding additional amount as a matching contribution.

For the Executive Board Chairman, the relative percentage of fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is around 29% and the percentage of the variable remuneration components on the whole around 64% of his target total remuneration. The percentage of the short-term (target) compensation of his target total remuneration is around 17%; that of the long-term compensation of his target total remuneration, around 47%. The percentage of pension commitments for the Executive Board Chairman is currently around 7% of his target total remuneration.

For the other Executive Board members, the relative percentage of the fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is between 45% and 51% of their respective total target remuneration and the percentage of all variable remuneration components between around 43% and 49% of their corresponding target total remuneration. The percentage of the short-term (target) compensation of their respective target total remuneration is between around 21% and 25%; that of the long-term compensation of their corresponding target total remuneration, between around 21% and 28%. The percentage of their pension commitments is currently between 0% and around 8% of their respective target total remuneration.

The defined relative proportions of the remuneration components correspond in their respective amounts to the requirements of the relevant remuneration policy

### III. Reclaiming or Reducing Variable Remuneration (Clawback)

After the German Corporate Governance Code had entered into force in the version of December 16, 2019 (GCGC 2019), as amended, provisions were included in all newly executed or amended Executive Board employment contracts, with each provision having a future effective date and specifying that the company is entitled to reclaim from Executive Board members variable remuneration components already paid out to them in the following cases described:

#### 1. Performance Clawback

If the entitlement to payment of annual short-term variable remuneration and of remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis in relation to the individual component of consolidated net profit is based on audited and approved consolidated financial statements that were objectively incorrect and therefore had to be subsequently corrected in accordance with the relevant accounting standards, and if no or a lower entitlement to payment of variable remuneration components would have arisen based on the corrected audited consolidated financial statements, the company may reclaim the corresponding amount of overpayment from the respective Executive Board member.

#### 2. Compliance Clawback

If an Executive Board member commits, either through gross negligence or willful intent, any dereliction of the duty to exercise the skill and care of a prudent manager faithfully complying with his duties in accordance with Section 93, Subsection 1, of the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG," the company shall be entitled to reclaim from the respective Executive Board member the full or partial repayment of the annual short-term variable remuneration paid out to him for the respective assessment period in which the breach of duty occurred, the remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis related to the individual component of the consolidated net profit, and of the liquidated phantom stock units and/or to declare that member's forfeiture with respect to tranches of phantom stock units yet to be granted.

The Executive Board member shall not be obligated to reimburse the company if more than three years have elapsed as counted from the payment of the respective variable remuneration components up to the time a claim against said member for reimbursement is asserted. The objection of disenrichment in accordance with Section 818, Subsection 3, of the German Civil Code "BGB" is excluded under the remuneration policy. The right to claim damages pursuant to Section 93 of the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG" shall remain unaffected.

#### 3. Exercise

In fiscal 2021, none of the conditions for reclaiming or reducing remuneration under these clawback provisions existed. Accordingly, no use was made of this right to exercise a clawback option.

### IV. Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

#### 1. Terms and Prerequisites for Termination of Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

The employment contracts of Executive Board members are concluded for the term of their respective appointments. Initial appointments are each for a maximum of three years; extensions of an appointment term are for up to five years.

The current terms of the employment contracts of the incumbent members of the Executive Board are as follows:

- Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg: November 10, 2025
- Dr. René Fáber: December 31, 2026

- Rainer Lehmann: February 28, 2025
- John Gerard Mackay: December 31, 2023

Termination of their employment contracts by giving due and proper notice is excluded. For this reason, an employment contract of an Executive Board member can only be terminated by mutual agreement based on a termination agreement or by termination for good cause with immediate effect. The company may terminate an Executive Board member's employment contract for good cause defined by the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG" as "grave cause," particularly in the event that the Supervisory Board revokes this member's appointment for said grave cause pursuant to Section 84, Subsection 3, of AktG. In this case, the statutory periods of notice pursuant to Section 622 of the German Civil Code "BGB" shall apply, unless there is also a compelling reason ("good cause") for termination without notice pursuant to Section 626 of BGB.

## 2. Severance Payments

The employment contracts for Executive Board members provide that a member will receive a severance payment in the event the company terminates the employment contract of said member with immediate effect, provided that said member is not responsible for any grave cause or compelling reason warranting said termination ahead of the regular contract expiration date. The amount of the severance payment shall be two years' salary maximum, but shall not exceed the amount of remuneration that would be payable until the end of the contract term.

Furthermore, in the event of early termination of employment on the Executive Board by mutual agreement, the company may also grant, or agree to grant, severance payments, the amount of which shall be limited, in turn, to a maximum of two years' remuneration and shall not compensate for more than the remaining term of the member's employment contract.

## 3. Non-Competition Clause

The Executive Board employment contracts provide for a post-contractual non-competition clause for a duration of up to two years upon termination of employment with the company. In the event that this non-competition clause is not waived or is nullified, half of the remuneration last paid by the company shall be granted to the respective Executive Board member as compensation for non-competition throughout the non-competition period. Any severance to be paid in connection with the termination of an employment contract to an Executive Board member shall be deducted in full from said compensation for non-competition in accordance with Recommendation G.13 of GCGC 2019 in the future – upon commencement of the respective new contract term and thus no later than the start of 2022 – provided that the employment contracts concerned have been extended after GCGC 2019 had entered into force. A different arrangement applies to the Executive Board contract of Rainer Lehmann whose contract term had already been extended earlier and whose contract does not contain any deduction clause.

## V. Procedure for Establishing and Implementing as well as Reviewing the Remuneration Policy

The Supervisory Board establishes and regularly reviews the remuneration policy for the Executive Board. The Executive Task Committee of the Supervisory Board prepares the remuneration policy for approval by the full Supervisory Board and makes the respective suggestions.

In the process, the Supervisory Board also reviews the appropriateness of such remuneration in comparison to the remuneration of the Executive Board within the peer group of the company (horizontal appropriateness). The peer group is defined by the Supervisory Board and/or its Executive Task Committee and is adapted as necessary. In defining the composition of the current peer group, the Executive Task Committee first reviewed domestic and foreign companies (from Germany, Europe and the USA) that are each comparable with Sartorius in terms of sector, size and sales. However, further analysis showed that the compensation levels at the relevant foreign companies differ significantly upwards from the compensation levels of the companies based in Germany and that the compensation levels differ considerably in terms of the

weighting of their components. Against this background, it was decided to include only companies based in Germany in the peer group, yet to make a deliberately broad selection and to reference a group of companies of different sizes, sectors and capital market indices. The peer group currently comprises the following companies: Bechtle, Carl Zeiss Meditec, Compugroup Medical, DMG Mori Seiki, Drägerwerk, Drillisch, ElingKlinger, Evotec, Freenet, Fresenius Medical Care, Gerresheimer, Grenke, KWS Saat, Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology, Qiagen, Siltronic, Software AG, Symrise, and United Internet.

In establishing the remuneration for the Executive Board members, the Supervisory Board further considers both the compensation of senior management and that of the remaining workforce in relation to the German Group companies (vertical appropriateness). For these purposes, the Supervisory Board defines senior management as the group of executives of the first two management levels below the Executive Board. The Supervisory Board looks not only at the current compensation ratio, but also at how it has developed over time.

If necessary, the Supervisory Board will engage an independent compensation consultant to review vertical and horizontal appropriateness; this was last done in 2018. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board also considers the requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code when determining and reviewing the remuneration of the Executive Board.

Any conflict of interest in the establishment, implementation and review of the remuneration policy shall be treated by the Supervisory Board in the same way as other conflicts of interest in the person of a Supervisory Board member. The Supervisory Board member concerned is therefore required to disclose any conflict of interest to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and will not participate in the adoption of resolutions or in the deliberations concerned. Disclosure of any conflicts of interest at an early stage ensures that the decisions of the Supervisory Board are not influenced by inappropriate considerations.

In the reporting year, the Executive Board employment contracts in force for the current Executive Board members already complied with the new remuneration policy, with a few divergences as explained above, and will fully comply with this policy as a matter of principle from 2022 onwards. If there will still be any divergences under the current Executive Board employment contracts beyond the current year – this relates only to the continued three-year assessment basis for the consolidated net profit component of long-term variable remuneration in the case of Mr. Rainer Lehmann – the Supervisory Board will examine, in consultation with the Executive Board member concerned, to which extent and, if applicable, from which period onward an adjustment can be made. As long as such divergences continue to exist, these will be presented in the company's Remuneration Report.

## VI. Compliance with the Maximum Remuneration Limits for the Executive Board

Under the new remuneration policy, the total remuneration consisting of a fixed salary including fringe benefits, employee benefit expense and the short- and long-term variable remuneration components for a fiscal year – irrespective of whether it is paid in the fiscal year in question or at another time – is limited to a maximum gross amount of €4.5 million for the Executive Board Chairman and €2.25 million for each of the other Executive Board members. The maximum remuneration covers the maximum possible non-performance-related fixed and performance-related variable remuneration components, including employee benefit expense. Benefits in kind granted as fringe benefits are recognized at their value for income tax purposes. Regarding the share-based compensation of the Executive Board Chairman, this compensation paid as part of his maximum remuneration is calculated based on the pro-rated grant value attributable to one year.

For all current Executive Board members, the individual components of their remuneration are already structured so that the total remuneration granted to each respective Executive Board member for a fiscal year – regardless of whether it is paid in the fiscal year in question or at another time – does not exceed the maximum remuneration established in the new remuneration policy. For this purpose, a separate maximum amount is set for each of the variable remuneration components. For short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis and for the long-term variable component related to the consolidated net profit,

this maximum amount is currently 120% of the target amount, and for participation in the phantom stock plan, 250% of the grant value assigned; for the purposes of maximum remuneration, the share-based compensation of the Executive Board Chairman is considered the pro-rated grant value attributable to one year and is thus an amount that is fixed from the outset (see above).

The following table shows the maximum limits for the variable remuneration components and the shares granted. Compliance with the maximum limits for short-term variable remuneration and for the shares granted can be reviewed already for fiscal 2021. For multi-year variable remuneration, compliance with the maximum limits can only be reviewed retroactively as soon as these are vested or phantom stock units are exercised.

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg		Dr. René Fäber			
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts
<b>Short-term variable remuneration</b>	<b>600</b>	<b>720</b>	<b>720</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>264</b>
<b>Long-term variable remuneration</b>						
Consolidated net profit 2021 (3 years)	325	390	-	110	132	-
Phantom stock plan 2021 (exercisable from 2025)	325	813	-	110	275	-
<b>Shares granted</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>

€ in K	Rainer Lehmann		John Gerard Mackay			
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	Receipts
<b>Short-term variable remuneration</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>264</b>
<b>Long-term variable remuneration</b>						
Consolidated net profit 2021 (3 years)	193	231	-	110	132	-
Phantom stock plan 2021 (exercisable from 2025)	193	481	-	110	275	-
<b>Shares granted</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>

The amount of the fixed remuneration components and the target and/or grant date amounts of the variable remuneration components for fiscal 2021 were selected for all Executive Board members so that even if the maximum amounts of the variable remuneration components are reached, the total gross amount of fixed and variable remuneration components of each Executive Board member will not exceed the highest sum defined by the maximum remuneration for this reporting year. The following table discloses the maximum achievable amounts of the individual remuneration components for 2021 and clearly shows that the maximum achievable remuneration is below the maximum achievable compensation defined for the Supervisory Board in accordance with Section 87a, Subsection 2, sentence 2, item no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Law (AktG).

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	Dr. René Fáber	Rainer Lehmann	John Gerard Mackay
Fixed remuneration	1,000	440	440	440
Fringe benefits	15	13	83	29
<b>Total non-performance-based remuneration</b>	<b>1,015</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>469</b>
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)	720	264	330	264
<b>Short-term variable remuneration</b>	<b>720</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>264</b>
Consolidated net profit (3 years)	390	132	231	132
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years)	813	275	481	275
<b>Long-term variable remuneration</b>	<b>1,203</b>	<b>407</b>	<b>712</b>	<b>407</b>
Shares granted	1000	0	0	0
Other remuneration component	45	45	45	45
Post-employment benefits	333	0	94	84
<b>Maximum achievable remuneration</b>	<b>4,316</b>	<b>1,169</b>	<b>1,705</b>	<b>1,269</b>
<b>Maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 87a, Subsec. 1, sentence 2, no. 1, of the German Stock Corporation Law</b>	<b>4,500</b>	<b>2,250</b>	<b>2,250</b>	<b>2,250</b>

The final review of compliance with the maximum remuneration for fiscal 2021 will be presented in the remuneration report for the fiscal year in which the last long-term remuneration component was vested and/or exercised. As Sartorius did not have any comparable policy for maximum remuneration in the past, no disclosures on compliance with maximum remuneration can be provided for an earlier business year.

## 2. Remuneration of the Executive Board Members in the Reporting Year

The remuneration granted and owed for active service on the Executive Board by all Executive Board members in 2021 was as €5,750K compared to €4,831K in the prior year. The details of the individual remuneration components are described in the following.

### Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Executive Board Pursuant to Section 162 of AktG

The following table shows the remuneration granted and owed to the Executive Board in accordance with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Law (AktG). Remuneration is deemed to be owed if it is due but has not yet been paid. In this case, remuneration granted is assumed already at the time service is performed and not only at the point in time of payment. The figures stated for variable remuneration components are the amounts "vested" in the respective fiscal year.

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg				Dr. René Fáber			
	2021	in %	2020	in %	2021	in %	2020	in %
Fixed remuneration	1,000	39%	903	41%	440	49%	440	62%
Fringe benefits <sup>1</sup>	15	1%	15	1%	13	1%	13	2%
<b>Total non-performance-based remuneration</b>	<b>1,015</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>918</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>63%</b>
<b>Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>720</b>	<b>28%</b>	<b>546</b>	<b>25%</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>30%</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>37%</b>
Consolidated net profit (3 years) <sup>3</sup>	266	10%	218	10%	128	14%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) <sup>4</sup>	539	21%	520	24%	0	0%	0	0%
Components with a long-term incentive effect	805	31%	738	34%	128	14%	0	0%
Other remuneration component	45	2%	0	0%	45	5%	0	0%
Defined Contribution Plans <sup>5</sup>	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>2,585</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,202</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>890</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>100%</b>

€ in K	Rainer Lehmann				John Gerard Mackay			
	2021	in %	2020	in %	2021	in %	2020	in %
Fixed remuneration	440	34%	438	38%	440	44%	440	57%
Fringe benefits <sup>1</sup>	83	6%	76	7%	29	3%	31	4%
<b>Total non-performance-based remuneration</b>	<b>523</b>	<b>41%</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>61%</b>
<b>Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>330</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>311</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>29%</b>
Consolidated net profit (3 years) <sup>3</sup>	128	10%	105	9%	128	13%	0	0%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) <sup>4</sup>	259	20%	208	18%	0	0%	0	0%
Components with a long-term incentive effect	387	30%	313	28%	128	13%	0	0%
Other remuneration component	45	4%	0	0%	45	5%	0	0%
Defined Contribution Plans <sup>5</sup>	0	0%	0	0%	84	8%	84	11%
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>1,285</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,138</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>990</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>777</b>	<b>100%</b>

1 The amounts contributed to D&O insurance totaling €470 K (2019: €205 K) are not included as these refer to the executive bodies of all companies of the Sartorius Group and are not allocated to the individual insureds.

2 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement.

3 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement of the plan in which a fiscal year ended; i.e., for 2021, consolidated net profits for 2019 - 2021 (2020: consolidated net profits for 2018 - 2020).

4 Fair value at the time granted.

5 Payments for a pension plan.

As part of the remuneration component based on the consolidated net profit of three consecutive fiscal years, each Executive Board member receives a partial compensation payment of 50% of his respective target achievement for the first fiscal year under review. Once the total target achievement has been determined after the third fiscal year, final payment is then effected by deducting the particular partial payment already made. The amounts of the partial payments made in total at the end of the reporting year are shown as follows:

€ in K	2021	2020
Balance as of Jan. 1 of a fiscal year	470	375
Partial payments deducted	-190	-185
Partial payments effected	327	280
<b>Balance as of Dec. 31 of a fiscal year</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>470</b>

## Remuneration Granted and Owed to Former Executive Board Members

€ in K	Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)		Jörg Pfirrmann (until Feb. 28, 2017)		Other	
	2021	2020	2021	2020	2021	2020
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) <sup>1</sup>	336	325	0	114	0	0
Capital payment	0	921	0	0	0	0
Annuity	0	0	0	0	517	501
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>336</b>	<b>1,246</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>501</b>

<sup>1</sup> Fair value at the time granted.

### 3. Disclosures on Share-Based Payments | Phantom Stock Units

	Number of phantom stock units	Price on assignment in €	Fair value when granted on Jan. 1 of the particular year € in K	Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2020 € in K	Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2021 € in K	Paid in fiscal 2021 € in K	Change in value in fiscal 2021 € in K	Status
<b>Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2017	2,950	70.51	208	520	0	520	0	Paid out in 2021
Tranche for fiscal 2018	2,685	80.32	216	539	539	0	0	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	1,950	113.78	222	555	555	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	1,240	190.30	236	401	590	0	189	Not exercisable
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>8,825</b>		<b>882</b>	<b>2,015</b>	<b>1,684</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>189</b>	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	918	354.13	325	0	500	0	175	Not exercisable
<b>Total sum of tranches</b>	<b>9,743</b>		<b>1,207</b>	<b>2,015</b>	<b>2,184</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>364</b>	
<b>Dr. René Fáber</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	187	275	0	88	Not exercisable
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>1,512</b>		<b>216</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>541</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>88</b>	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	0	169	0	59	Not exercisable
<b>Total sum of tranches</b>	<b>1,823</b>		<b>326</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>147</b>	
<b>Rainer Lehmann</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2017	1,182	70.51	83	208	0	208	0	Paid out in 2021
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,289	80.32	104	259	259	0	0	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	936	190.30	178	303	445	0	142	Not exercisable
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>4,341</b>		<b>471</b>	<b>1,036</b>	<b>970</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>142</b>	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	544	354.13	193	0	297	0	104	Not exercisable
<b>Total sum of tranches</b>	<b>4,885</b>		<b>664</b>	<b>1,036</b>	<b>1,267</b>	<b>208</b>	<b>246</b>	
<b>John Gerard Mackay</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	187	275	0	88	Not exercisable
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>1,512</b>		<b>216</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>541</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>88</b>	
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	0	169	0	59	Not exercisable
<b>Total sum of tranches</b>	<b>1,823</b>		<b>326</b>	<b>453</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>147</b>	
<b>Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2017	1,844	70.51	130	325	0	325	0	Paid out in 2021
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,673	80.32	134	336	336	0	0	exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2019	661	113.78	75	188	188	0	0	Not exercisable
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>4,178</b>		<b>339</b>	<b>849</b>	<b>524</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>Jörg Pfirrmann (until Feb. 28, 2017)</b>								
Tranche for fiscal 2017	644	70.51	45	114	0	114	0	Paid out in 2021
<b>Sum of the tranches from the previous years</b>	<b>644</b>		<b>45</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>0</b>	

## 4. Pension Commitments

The projected pension payments, the present value of pension obligations and service cost are shown in the following table:

€ in K	Projected pension payment	Present value of the obligation (IFRS)		Service cost (IFRS)	
	p.a.	Dec. 31, 2021	Dec. 31, 2020	2021	2020
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	266	4,941	4,943	177	187
Rainer Lehmann	84	391	192	0	0
	<b>350</b>	<b>5,332</b>	<b>5,135</b>	<b>177</b>	<b>187</b>

Furthermore, in 2021, a pension contribution of €138K was expensed for Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg (2020: €124K) and of €91K for Mr. Rainer Lehmann (2020: €62K).

## 5. Comparative Table

€ in K	2021	Change in %	2020
<b>Managing Board Members</b>			
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	2,585	17%	2,202
Dr. René Fáber	890	25%	714
Rainer Lehmann	1,285	13%	1,138
John Gerard Mackay	990	27%	777
<b>Former Managing Board Members</b>			
Reinhard Vogt	336	-73%	1,246
Jörg Pfirrmann	0	-100%	114
Other	517	3%	501
<b>Earnings Development</b>			
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,175	70%	692
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	41	-64%	113
<b>Average Remuneration of Employees</b>			
Group employees in Germany only	89	1%	88

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

## 6. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Supervisory Board

The remuneration for Supervisory Board members is defined in the Articles of Association of Sartorius AG and comprises fixed remuneration, meeting attendance fees and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Members serving as chairperson and vice chairperson of the Supervisory Board receive higher fixed remuneration.

Members and chairpersons of Supervisory Board committees, except for those of Nomination Committee or the committee pursuant to Section 27, Subsection 3, of the German Codetermination Law (MitBestG), are entitled to receive additional annual fixed amounts and meeting attendance fees as well as reimbursement of their out-of-pocket expenses.

Besides this, the members of the Supervisory Board are included in a Directors and Officers (D&O) liability insurance policy taken out for members of management bodies. The premiums of this insurance are paid by Sartorius Aktiengesellschaft. This D&O insurance policy covers the legal liability arising from Supervisory Board activities and is taken out at standard market terms and conditions.

In line with prevailing market practice at listed companies in Germany, the remuneration of Supervisory Board members is strictly fixed compensation along with meeting attendance fees and does not include any performance-related components. The Executive Board and Supervisory Board are of the opinion that strictly fixed remuneration for Supervisory Board members is best suited to strengthening the independence of the Supervisory Board and fulfilling the latter's advisory and supervisory functions, which are to be performed independently of the company's success. The amount and structure of Supervisory Board remuneration ensure that the company is able to attract qualified candidates for membership in the company's Supervisory Board; in this way, Supervisory Board remuneration helps sustainably promote the business strategy and the long-term development of the company. The existing remuneration policy especially takes into account Recommendation G.17 and the Suggestion G.18, sentence 1, of the German Corporate Governance Code in the current version as amended.

## 7. Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Remuneration for the Supervisory Board Members</b>		
Total remuneration	1,057	1,049
Fixed remuneration	675	675
Compensation for committee work	121	120
Meeting attendance fee	192	186
Total remuneration for the Sartorius Stedim Biotech subgroup	69	68
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	69	68

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)</b>		
Total remuneration	261	262
Fixed remuneration	135	135
Compensation for committee work	33	33
Meeting attendance fee	24	26
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	69	68

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman)<sup>1</sup></b>		
Total remuneration	137	140
Fixed remuneration	90	90
Compensation for committee work	24	24
Meeting attendance fee	23	26

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Annette Becker<sup>1</sup></b>		
Total remuneration	70	54
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	8	0
Meeting attendance fee	17	9

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.</b>		
Total remuneration	57	56
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	12	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Dr. Daniela Favoccia</b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	12	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Petra Kirchhoff</b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	12	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Karoline Kleinschmidt <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	12	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Dietmar Müller (as of May 16, 2020) <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>31</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	28
Compensation for committee work	13	0
Meeting attendance fee	17	3

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Ilke Hildegard Panzer</b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>56</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	12	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Hermann Jens Ritzau (as of Mar. 1, 2021) <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>0</b>
Fixed remuneration	38	0
Meeting attendance fee	11	0

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheper</b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>56</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	11	11

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher</b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>108</b>
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	39	39
Meeting attendance fee	24	24

## Former Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Uwe Bretthauer (until Feb. 28, 2021) <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>95</b>
Fixed remuneration	7	45
Compensation for committee work	4	24
Meeting attendance fee	5	26

€ in K	2021	2020
<b>Michael Dohrmann (until May 15, 2020) <sup>1</sup></b>		
<b>Total remuneration</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>23</b>
Fixed remuneration	0	17
Meeting attendance fee	0	6

<sup>1</sup> The employee representatives declared that they donate their Supervisory Board remuneration to the foundation Hans-Böckler-Stiftung according to the guidelines of the German Trade Union Association.

Beyond their Supervisory Board remuneration, the employee representatives who are employees within the Sartorius Group receive compensation that is not related to their service on the Supervisory Board.

## 8. Comparative Table

€ in K	2021	Change in %	2020
<b>Supervisory Board Members</b>			
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)	261	0%	262
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman)	137	-2%	140
Annette Becker	70	30%	54
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.	57	2%	56
Dr. Daniela Favocchia	57	2%	56
Petra Kirchoff	57	2%	56
Karoline Kleinschmidt	57	2%	56
Dietmar Müller (as of May 16, 2020)	75	142%	31
Ilke Hildegard Panzer	57	2%	56
Hermann Jens Ritzau (as of Mar. 1, 2021)	49		
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheper	56	0%	56
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher	108	0%	108
<b>Former Supervisory Board Members</b>			
Uwe Bretthauer (until Feb. 28, 2021)	16	-83%	95
Michael Dohrmann (until May 15, 2020)	0	-100%	23
<b>Earnings Development</b>			
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,175	70%	692
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	41	-64%	113
<b>Average Remuneration of Employees</b>			
Group employees in Germany only	89	1%	88

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.