

Sartorius Group

Remuneration Report

Extract from the Annual Report 2022

Remuneration Report

1. Main Features of the Remuneration Policy for the Executive Board

A. Main Features of the Remuneration Policy and Contribution Toward Promoting the Corporate Strategy and Long-Term Development of the Company

The remuneration policy for the Executive Board was revised by the Supervisory Board and approved by the Annual General Meeting on March 25, 2022. It aims to remunerate the members of the Executive Board appropriately in line with their tasks and responsibilities and to directly consider the performance of each member of the Executive Board and the success of the company. For this reason, the remuneration policy includes both short-term and long-term variable remuneration components in addition to fixed remuneration components.

The company strategy seeks to achieve profitable growth and a sustained, long-term increase in the value of the company. This strategy is the basis from which the structure of the remuneration policy is derived for the Executive Board of Sartorius AG: The short-term variable remuneration depends on annual corporate targets that are aligned with key performance indicators for profitable growth of the company. Long-term remuneration is based on corporate objectives that reflect the sustainable long-term growth of the Group and the long-term performance of the share price, which directly mirrors the development of the company's value. As a result, the company's remuneration policy creates incentives to promote the long-term and positive sustainable development of the company.

The policy for remuneration of the Executive Board members is designed to be simple, clear and understandable. It meets the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Law ("Aktengesetz" abbreviated as "AktG") as well as the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code ("**GCGC**") with the exception of any divergences explained in the Declaration of Compliance with the Recommendations of the GCGC as amended from time to time. The existing divergences in the reporting year from the recommendations of the applicable GCGC in the area of remuneration are given below.

B. Details of the Remuneration Policy

		Remuneration components	Structure of the remuneration components	Maximum bonus (in % of the target amount)	Maximum remuneration	Further benefits	
Fixed		Fixed remuneration	Basic remuneration + Fringe benefits	100%	Maximum amount of all cash remuneration components for the respective fiscal year	Compensation for post-contractual non-competition clause (50% of most recent remuneration)	
		Retirement benefits	Basic amount	100%		Additional amount (matching contribution)	120%
Variable	Cash	Short-term variable remuneration	Sales revenue Order intake (Group and/or division)	120%			
			Underlying EBITDA (Group and/or division)				
			Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA (Group)				
			Consolidated net profit			120%	Severance cap in the event of early contract termination
	Reduction of CO ² -equivalent emission intensity	120%					
	Phantom stock units	250%					
	Share-based payment	Share-based payment	One-time allotment; afterwards, no measurement of inflow	+ Proportional grant date fair value of share-based payment for the respective fiscal year		Extraordinary performance	

I. Remuneration Components

1. Overview of the Individual Remuneration Components

Remuneration consists of fixed and variable components. The fixed components are the fixed annual salary and fringe benefits. The variable performance-based components are comprised of short-term components with a one-year assessment basis and of long-term components with a multi-year assessment basis. In addition, there are pension commitments, which depend, among other things, on the amount of the own contribution made by the respective Executive Board member in the form of deferred compensation for variable remuneration components, and which are therefore also variable.

2. Fixed Remuneration Components

a) Fixed Annual Remuneration

Fixed annual remuneration is cash compensation related to a specific fiscal year, and is based in particular on the area of duties and responsibilities of the respective Executive Board member. This fixed annual remuneration is paid in twelve monthly installments.

b) Fringe Benefits

Beyond the remuneration components stated above, the members of the Executive Board receive the following fringe benefits: each member is entitled to use a company car that can also be utilized for private purposes and to be covered by accident insurance taken out in the respective Executive Board member's name as a beneficiary. Moreover, for Executive Board members residing outside Germany – namely Rainer Lehmann and John Gerard Mackay in the 2022 reporting year – the costs for taking flights home and running two households as well as the costs associated with said activities are also paid by the company as fringe benefits.

In addition, the company maintains a D&O insurance policy concluded for Executive Board members as beneficiaries. The respective insurance premiums are not of a remunerative nature and are therefore not recognized as salary expenses.

3. Variable Performance-Based Remuneration Components

a) Short-Term Variable Remuneration with a One-Year Assessment Basis

In addition to the fixed remuneration components, all Executive Board members are entitled to receive short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis.

Target Parameters

The short-term variable remuneration with a one-year assessment basis consists of four individual components that relate to the subordinate financial targets of average sales revenue and order intake, underlying EBITDA, ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA, and the employee net promoter score (ENPS), a measure of how likely employees would recommend Sartorius to others as an employer.

These subordinate targets are key control elements for profitable growth as well as for a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company and serve to implement the overarching strategic goals of the Group.

Measurement of Target Achievement and Payment

For each target parameter, the Supervisory Board has defined a formula that is used to calculate the amount to be paid out according to the degree of target achievement for the associated individual component. For each of these components, the Supervisory Board also sets (i) a minimum target to be achieved below which the amount that will be paid out is zero, and (ii) a maximum target to be achieved above which the amount that will be paid out will no longer increase. Therefore, the amount paid out for each subordinate target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap is currently 120% for all subordinate targets.

For each of the individual components of short term variable remuneration with a one year assessment basis, the Supervisory Board sets a separate individual target amount for every Executive Board member before the beginning of a fiscal year. This target amount is used as the basis to determine the specific amount to be paid out according to the particular target achievement of the relevant subordinate target for the fiscal year in question. The targets are weighted for the individual Executive Board members according to their area of responsibility and relate to the divisions and/or to the Group, respectively.

The Supervisory Board derives each target value of the subordinate financial targets from the approved annual budget for a respective fiscal year and determines the degree of target achievement by comparing it with the actual result reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited and approved for the respective fiscal year. When it comes to the non-financial target parameters, the degree of target achievement is determined by comparing the target values set by the Supervisory Board with the respective actual results. The Supervisory Board may make adjustments to the actual figures to take account of non-recurring, exceptional circumstances or non-operating effects resulting, for example, from acquisitions or divestments during the year.

Annual short-term variable remuneration is calculated for a fiscal year ended and paid in the following fiscal year.


The subordinate targets within the short-term variable remuneration are weighted for the Executive Board members as follows:

Subordinate Target	Executive Board Chairman Chief Financial Officer	Executive Board Members with Division Responsibility
Related to the Sartorius Group		
Average calculated from sales revenue order intake	40%	10%
Underlying EBITDA	40%	10%
Ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA	10%	10%
Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)	10%	3%
Related to the particular division		
Average calculated from sales revenue order intake	--	30%
Underlying EBITDA	--	30%
Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)	--	7%

Subordinate Target “Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake”

The subordinate target “Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake” is a key performance indicator of growth and is derived from the budget for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 90% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 104%. If 90% of the target amount is achieved, 50% of the associated individual target sum will be paid out; if the target is achieved at less than 90%, no payment is rendered for this sub-target. If 104% of the target amount is achieved, an amount equal to 120% of the corresponding individual target amount will be paid out; if the target is achieved in excess of this percentage, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Intermediate values are interpolated linearly. Target achievement is measured on the basis of actual sales and order intake in constant currencies, as reported in the company’s consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for the amounts contributed by businesses acquired or divested during the respective reporting year to the extent that such businesses are not part of the target amount.

Sales revenue | Order intake




Due to the company’s performance in 2022, achievement of the subordinate target “Average of Sales Revenue | Order Intake” differed between the Group and division level. At the Group level, target achievement stood at 90.18% of the target value, resulting in a payout rate of 50.9% for the Chairman of the Executive Board and the Chief Financial Officer. In the Bioprocess Solutions Division, target achievement stood at 87.49% of the target value, corresponding to a payout rate of 0%, and in the Lab Products & Services Division at 101.67%,

corresponding to a payout rate of 108.4%, resulting in the corresponding payout to the respective board member responsible for the division.

Subordinate Target “Underlying EBITDA”

The subordinate target “Underlying EBITDA” is a key indicator of the Group’s profitability, which can also be used to present the Group’s operating performance in a more comparable way internationally. Underlying EBITDA represents earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization adjusted for extraordinary effects. The target is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 70% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 120%. The level of the bonus payment is linear to the level of target achievement; i.e., if 70% of the subordinate target is achieved, 70% of the related individual target amount will be paid out, or if 120% of the target is achieved, 120% of the related individual target amount will be paid out. If the target is achieved at less than 70%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. By contrast, if the target is achieved by 120% or more, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual underlying EBITDA figure, as reported in the company’s consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as by taking into account current exchange rates.

Underlying EBITDA




In fiscal 2022, target achievement for the subordinate target "Underlying EBITDA" stood at 95.59% of the respective target value for the Group as a whole, 94.14% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division and 104.12% for the Lab Products & Services Division, which translate into payout rates of 95.6% for the Group, 94.1% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division and 104.1% for the Lab Products & Services Division and are paid out to the members of the Executive Board in accordance with the respective weighting of the subordinate targets.

Subordinate Target "Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA"

The subordinate target "ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA" is a key financial ratio regarding the Group's debt financing capacity. This ratio is calculated as the quotient of net debt and underlying EBITDA. It is derived from the budget and is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group. The level of the bonus paid lies between 50% and 120% of the respective subordinate target amount. If the target ratio is reached, the bonus level to be paid is 100%. If net debt to underlying EBITDA is above the target ratio, the bonus level will decrease proportionately down to 50% if the maximum amount defined by the Supervisory Board for the ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA is reached. If the ratio exceeds this maximum amount, no bonus will be paid for this subordinate target. By contrast, if net debt to underlying EBITDA is below the target ratio, the bonus amount is capped at 120%, with the associated ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA derived mathematically on a linear proportional basis from the maximum and target values for this ratio as defined by the Supervisory Board. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual ratio of net debt to underlying EBITDA in constant currencies, as reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved, as well as adjusted for inflows and outflows entailed by strategic (capital) measures, such as acquisitions, provided that such inflows and outflows are not included in the target ratio.

Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA




In fiscal 2022, target achievement for the subordinate target "Ratio of Net Debt to Underlying EBITDA" stood at 77.0%, resulting in a corresponding payout for this subordinate target.

Subordinate Target "Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)"

The subordinate target "Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)" refers to the non-financial component of employee satisfaction. The focus is on a high or competitive recommendation rate, which is currently polled twice a year within the scope of global employee surveys. The target is defined by the Supervisory Board for the Group or division, respectively. The minimum target achievement is 70% of the target amount, and this amount is capped at 120%. The level of the bonus payment is linear to the level of target achievement; i.e., if 70% of the subordinate target is achieved, 50% of the related individual target amount will be paid out, or if 112% of the target is achieved, 120% of the related individual target amount will be paid out. If the target is achieved at less than 70%, no payment will be made for this subordinate target. By contrast, if the target is achieved by 112% or more, this will not further increase the amount to be paid out. Target achievement is measured on the basis of the actual value achieved.

Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)



In fiscal 2022, target achievement for the subordinate target "Employee Net Promoter Score (ENPS)" stood at 83.50% of the target value for the Group, as a whole, 71.43% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division, and 105.26% for the Lab Products & Services Division. This target achievement results in payout amounts of 72.5% for the Group, 52.4% for the Bioprocess Solutions Division, and 108.8% for the Lab Products & Services Division, so that each member of the Executive Board is paid an amount corresponding to the respective weighting of the individual target amount for this subordinate target.

b) Long-Term Variable Remuneration Components

In the reporting year, the long-term variable remuneration components for all members of the Executive Board consisted of the following three individual components: Each individual component is based on the development of consolidated net profit, the reduction in CO₂ emissions intensity and the development of the Sartorius AG preference share price over a four-year assessment period. As a result, the long-term variable remuneration components are also aligned with target parameters that measure profitable growth and a sustainable and long-term increase in the value of the company and the achievement of the climate targets derived from the company's sustainability strategy, and thus serve to implement the company's overarching strategic objectives.

The aforementioned long-term variable remuneration components are weighted as follows: 25% each for consolidated net profit and reduction in CO₂-equivalent emission intensity and 50% for the phantom stock plan. For each of the individual components, a separate individual target amount is set for each Executive Board member, on the basis of which the specific payment amount is determined in each case based on the level at which the associated targets were achieved for the relevant fiscal years.

The Executive Board Chairman Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based compensation as a further long-term variable remuneration component. The long-term increase in the value of the company as an overriding strategic objective of the company is also promoted by this share-based compensation and participation provided by this in the development of the price of the company's shares. The respective long-term variable remuneration components together generally represent the majority of the variable compensation components for each Executive Board member.

The "consolidated net profit" and "reduction in CO₂-equivalent emissions intensity" components of long-term variable remuneration are each weighted at 25%. In contrast, the "development of preference share price" component of long-term variable remuneration is weighted at 50%. As a result, the share-based portion of variable remuneration, in deviation from Recommendation G.10, sentence 1 of the GCGC, does not, in


principle, constitute the predominant portion of Executive Board members' variable remuneration. The Supervisory Board believes that even with the current weighting, an incentive structure is achieved which is geared to the sustainable and long-term development of the company. In the case of the Chairman of the Executive Board, however, his variable remuneration is predominantly share-based in view of the additional share bonus granted, in line with this Recommendation.

Consolidated Net Profit

The individual component based on consolidated net profit has an assessment period of four consecutive fiscal years (until 2021: three consecutive fiscal years) and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche in question is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The payout amount for the respective tranche is based on the total target achievement for the respective measurement period, which corresponds to the average target achievement for each of the four fiscal years of the relevant measurement period. For each fiscal year, the Supervisory Board annually defines a target for consolidated net profit in euros. To determine the level of target achievement for a fiscal year, the consolidated net profit (up to and including the 2020 amount granted, after deduction of non-controlling interest) that is reported in the company's consolidated financial statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved and excludes amortization (impairment of the value of intangible assets due to business combinations pursuant to IFRS 3) is compared with the respective target set by the Supervisory Board. In individual cases, the Supervisory Board may make adjustments to the actual value to account for non-recurring extraordinary or non-operating items (such as acquisitions).

The amount paid out is determined on the basis of the individual target amount and the formula defined by the Supervisory Board. It establishes (i) a minimum target achievement level of 50%, below which the payout is zero, and (ii) a maximum target achievement level, above which the payout amount no longer increases. Therefore, the amount paid out for this remuneration target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap currently stands at 120% for all individual target amounts and is reached at a target achievement level of 120%. This remuneration component is generally paid after the end of the last fiscal year of the assessment period for the tranche in question, which was four years for tranches granted in the reporting year and three years for tranches granted in previous years.

Average net profit



In order to balance out the payout amounts over time, in the past a partial payment was paid out in the amount of 50% of the payout amount, determined on the basis of the level of target achievement for the first fiscal year of the assessment period of a tranche in each case, based on the individual subordinate target amount. This partial payment only applies to Rainer Lehmann, whose contract predates the new remuneration policy coming into effect as it pertains to this component. Such a partial amount is calculated and paid out at the end of the first fiscal year of a respective assessment period based on the company's consolidated financial

statements audited according to the defined audit focal points and approved. Any overpayment as a result of these partial payments will be offset against other remuneration components once the total target achievement level has been determined after the third or fourth fiscal year of the relevant assessment period.

The target for the “consolidated net profit” component for fiscal 2022 was achieved at 96.8% of the target value. For the 2020 to 2022 multi-year assessment period, the target achievement level stands at 118%, meaning that a payout of 118% less the partial payment granted in 2020 will apply for this three-year period. The complete target achievement for the multi-year assessment period beginning in 2022 cannot be determined until the consolidated financial statements audited and approved for 2025 are available.


Reduction in CO₂ emission intensity

The individual component related to the reduction in CO₂ emission intensity has an assessment period of four fiscal years and begins with the fiscal year in which the tranche in question is granted. A new tranche is granted on a rolling basis for each fiscal year. The amount paid out for a particular tranche depends on the individual target amount and target achievement for the respective assessment period. Each year, the Supervisory Board sets a target value for each tranche for the average annual reduction in CO₂ emission intensity during the assessment period, which corresponds to the current target value of the company’s sustainability strategy for this period (currently 10% reduction per fiscal year measured against the baseline value for 2019) and whose starting value is derived from the audited Non-financial Group Statement for the previous year. To determine the target achievement of this parameter, the final value used is based on the actual value of the CO₂ emission intensity reached in the last fiscal year of the respective four-year assessment period for the corresponding tranche, as reported in the respective audited Group Non-financial Statement. If specific reasons exist, the Supervisory Board will make appropriate corrections to base effects and recording inaccuracies.

The amount paid out is determined on the basis of the individual target amount and the formula defined by the Supervisory Board. It establishes (i) a minimum target achievement level of 50%, below which the payout is zero, and (ii) a maximum target achievement level, above which the payout amount no longer increases. Therefore, the amount paid out for this remuneration target is capped at the maximum percentage of the individual target amount. This cap stands at 120% and is reached at a target achievement level of 120%.

This remuneration component is paid out after the end of the fourth fiscal year of the assessment period for the tranche in question.

CO₂ emission intensity



Target achievement for the multi-year assessment period beginning in 2022 cannot be determined until the audited and approved consolidated financial statements for 2025 are available.

Development of the Preference Share Price (Phantom Stock Plan)

As the third individual component of long-term variable compensation, Executive Board members receive virtual shares, known as phantom stock units. Through the issue of such phantom shares, Executive Board members are treated as if they were owners of a certain number of preference shares in Sartorius AG, without, however, being entitled to receive dividends. The development of the value of these phantom stocks is linked with the development of the Sartorius preference share; both increases and decreases in the share price are taken into account. Later, the value of these phantom stocks are assessed based on the share price at the time, and its equivalent is paid out in cash, provided that the associated conditions are met. Phantom stocks cannot be traded and do not confer any rights to purchase shares.

According to the Sartorius phantom stock plan, each Executive Board member is credited at the beginning of every year with phantom stock units valued at an agreed monetary value. The value of these phantom stocks can be paid out only as an entire annual tranche. Payment can be requested at the earliest after a period of four years and no later than after eight years. If a member is appointed to the Executive Board during a year, this member will be assigned phantom stock units retroactively as of the beginning of this fiscal year (pro rata temporis, if applicable).

An Executive Board member is entitled to receive payment for phantom stock units only if the share price at the time of such payment request has appreciated at least 7.5% per year relative to the time the phantom stock units were assigned or if the share price outperformed the TecDAX as a comparative index. In addition, the value of the phantom stock units must be at least 50% of the grant value. The phantom stock plan rules out subsequent changes to the parameters used for comparative stock valuation.

Assignment of these phantom stock units and later payment of their monetary equivalent depend on the mean value calculated from the average prices of the Sartorius AG preference share, with said prices quoted in the closing auction of Xetra trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (or a corresponding successor trading system) over the last 20 days of trading of the previous year (in the case of granting) or over the last 20 days of trading prior to submission of a payment request (in the case of payment). This serves to compensate for any short-term fluctuations in the share prices.

The payout amount is capped at a maximum of 2.5 times the share price at the time the phantom stock units were granted, based in each case on the individual annual tranche.

Under the current terms of the phantom stock plan, payment for phantom stock is blocked for the four weeks preceding the scheduled publication date of quarterly results and for the 30 calendar days before the scheduled publication of the half-year results and preliminary year-end results, as well as for 20 days of trading on the stock exchange following the actual publication of quarterly and preliminary year-end results. These black-out periods are intended to ensure that payments are only made during periods in which the most recent business results have already been processed in the capital market and the regular publication of further business results is still sufficiently far in the future.

The fair value grant price for this remuneration component is €574.61 for 2022. Target achievement for this subordinate target is reported in the remuneration report after vesting or exercise by the Executive Board members; i.e., between 2026 and 2030.

Share-Based Payment

In December 2019, Executive Board Chairman Dr. Kreuzburg was additionally granted share-based payment in connection with the fourth extension of his appointment as a member and Chairman of the Executive Board as well as CEO. This was in the form of company shares with a grant date fair value totaling €5.0 million (based on the share price as of December 5, 2019, as the grant date); this corresponds to a proportional grant date fair value of €1.0 million for each year of his new five-year term of appointment. For this purpose, a corresponding number of treasury shares (27,570 treasury shares in total), consisting of equal proportions of the company's

own preference shares and own ordinary shares, were transferred to Dr. Kreuzburg at the beginning of his new term in November 2020. The shares granted are subject to a holding period that will end on November 10, 2024. Should Dr. Kreuzburg leave the company prior to November 11, 2022, at his own request, his entitlements to be granted said shares by transfer shall lapse in their entirety. If Dr. Kreuzburg leaves the company after November 10, 2022, and before November 11, 2024, at his own request, half of his entitlements to be granted said shares shall lapse. For the purpose of the target total remuneration, the shares granted for Dr. Kreuzburg's current five-year term of appointment are recognized at their pro-rated grant date fair value for each year of his term of appointment. Dr. Kreuzburg sold a total of 20,000 preference shares on November 14, 2022. This reported transaction was published on the Sartorius AG website.

4. Pension Commitments

The members of the Executive Board generally receive pension commitments as defined-benefit plans for their first reappointment. At the request of the Executive Board member concerned, the company will take out an insurance policy for the term of their employment contract and pay the particular benefit contributions into this insurance policy. The pension contribution consists of a base amount of 14% of the respective member's annual fixed remuneration. If desired, the Executive Board member in question can pay in an additional 7% of the gross amount paid to the Executive Board member in the fiscal year in question as short-term variable compensation and as long-term variable compensation attributable to net profit as a personal contribution by way of deferred compensation. If a member of the Executive Board exercises this right, the company will in turn make an additional contribution in the same amount (known as a matching contribution benefit). For the purpose of determining the target total compensation and the relative share of the pension commitments in a member's target total remuneration, only the basic amount to be paid by the company and the matching benefit contribution were taken into account (based on 100% target achievement of the relevant variable remuneration components).

Pursuant to the insurance terms and conditions, the pension benefit can be granted in the form of a retirement pension or a lump-sum payment for reaching the regular retirement age or needing to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of surviving dependents' benefits for widows and orphans, according to which particular option an Executive Board member elects. The company does not guarantee the paid-in capital or an annual interest rate.

Furthermore, an earlier pension agreement granted to Dr. Kreuzburg provides that he will receive a monthly pension dependent on the basic salary of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz") in the respective version applicable. With each full year of service on the Executive Board, 5% of his full pension will be vested until his fully vested pension will have been reached after 20 years. In this case, these retirement benefits will have been fully vested, taking his years of service on the Executive Board into account, at the end of December 31, 2021. His retirement benefits will be granted in the form of a pension in the cases where he reaches the regular retirement age or needs to retire due to disability, as well as in the form of a pension for widows and orphans and shall correspond to 70% of the monthly pension benefits of a German federal civil servant classified as grade 10 of salary class B for ministry officials according to the Federal Civil Service Remuneration Act ("Bundesbesoldungsgesetz"). These additional pension commitments are considered in the determination of Dr. Kreuzburg's target total remuneration and of the relative proportion of his pension commitments in his target total remuneration along with the respective employee benefit expense attributable thereto.

The regular retirement age for all pension commitments is 65. There are no early retirement regulations, except in the case of disability.

5. Other Remuneration Components

The remuneration policy provides that the Supervisory Board may grant special compensation at its reasonable discretion for extraordinary performance by a member of the Executive Board. This option was not used in the reporting year.

II. Target Total Remuneration; Relative Percentages of Fixed and Variable Remuneration Components

The Supervisory Board determines a specific target total remuneration for each Executive Board member. The target total remuneration is the sum of all remuneration components relevant for total remuneration. For the variable components, the target amount is taken as a basis in each case of 100% target achievement, provided that a target is measured. In the case of share-based compensation, which is granted as an additional variable remuneration component only to the Executive Board Chairman, the prorated grant date fair value (= €1.0 million annually) is recognized for each year of the Chairman's associated contract term to ensure transparent and traceable reporting for the purposes of target total remuneration. Regarding pension commitments, it is further assumed that the Executive Board members will exercise their right to receive deferred compensation of their variable remuneration components (based on 100% achievement of targets) to the maximum extent permitted and that the company will therefore also pay each member a corresponding additional amount as a matching contribution.

For the Executive Board Chairman, the relative percentage of fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is roughly 29% and the percentage of the variable remuneration components on the whole roughly 65% of his target total remuneration. The percentage of the short-term (target) compensation of his target total remuneration is roughly 17%; that of the long-term compensation of his target total remuneration, roughly 48%. The percentage of pension commitments for the Executive Board Chairman is currently roughly 6% of his target total remuneration.

For the other Executive Board members, the relative percentage of the fixed remuneration components (fixed annual salary and fringe benefits) is between 37% and 43% of their respective total target remuneration and the percentage of all variable remuneration components between roughly 50% and 55% of their corresponding target total remuneration. In this context, short-term (target) compensation accounts for between roughly 21% and 23% of total target compensation, while long-term (target) compensation accounts for between roughly 29% and 32% of total target compensation. Pension commitments currently account for between 7% and roughly 8% of total target compensation.

The defined relative proportions of the remuneration components correspond in their respective amounts to the requirements of the relevant remuneration policy.

III. Reclaiming or Reducing Variable Remuneration (Clawback)

All Executive Board employment contracts contain provisions specifying that the company is entitled to reclaim from Executive Board members variable remuneration components already paid out to them in the following cases described:

1. Performance Clawback

If the entitlement to payment of annual short-term variable remuneration and of remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis in relation to the individual component of consolidated net profit is based on audited and approved consolidated financial statements that were objectively incorrect and therefore had to be subsequently corrected in accordance with the relevant accounting standards, and if no or a lower entitlement to payment of variable remuneration components would have arisen based on the corrected audited consolidated financial statements, the company may reclaim the corresponding amount of overpayment from the respective Executive Board member.

2. Compliance Clawback

If an Executive Board member commits, either through gross negligence or willful intent, any dereliction of the duty to exercise the skill and care of a prudent manager faithfully complying with his duties in accordance with Section 93, Subsection 1, of the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG," the company shall be entitled to reclaim from the respective Executive Board member the full or partial repayment of the annual short-term variable remuneration paid out to him for the respective assessment period in which the breach of duty occurred, the remuneration with a multi-year assessment basis related to the individual component of the consolidated net profit, and of the liquidated phantom stock units and/or to declare that member's forfeiture with respect to tranches of phantom stock units yet to be granted.

The Executive Board member shall not be obligated to reimburse the company if more than three years have elapsed as counted from the payment of the respective variable remuneration components up to the time a claim against said member for reimbursement is asserted. The objection of disenrichment in accordance with Section 818, Subsection 3, of the German Civil Code "BGB" is excluded under the remuneration policy. The right to claim damages pursuant to Section 93 of the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG" shall remain unaffected.

3. Exercise

In fiscal 2022, none of the conditions for reclaiming or reducing remuneration under these clawback provisions existed. Accordingly, no use was made of this right to exercise a clawback option.

IV. Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

1. Terms and Prerequisites for Termination of Remuneration-Related Legal Transactions

The employment contracts of Executive Board members are concluded for the term of their respective appointments. Initial appointments are each for a maximum of three years; extensions of an appointment term are for up to five years.

The current terms of the employment contracts of the incumbent members of the Executive Board are as follows:

- Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg: November 10, 2025
- Dr. René Fáber: December 31, 2026
- Rainer Lehmann: February 28, 2025
- John Gerard Mackay: December 31, 2023

Termination of their employment contracts by giving due and proper notice is excluded. For this reason, an employment contract of an Executive Board member can only be terminated by mutual agreement based on a termination agreement or by termination for good cause with immediate effect. The company may terminate an Executive Board member's employment contract for good cause defined by the German Stock Corporation Law "AktG" as "grave cause," particularly in the event that the Supervisory Board revokes this member's appointment for said grave cause pursuant to Section 84, Subsection 3, of AktG. In this case, the statutory periods of notice pursuant to Section 622 of the German Civil Code "BGB" shall apply, unless there is also a compelling reason ("good cause") for termination without notice pursuant to Section 626 of BGB.

2. Severance Payments

The employment contracts for Executive Board members provide that a member will receive a severance payment in the event the company terminates the employment contract of said member with immediate effect, provided that said member is not responsible for any grave cause or compelling reason warranting said termination ahead of the regular contract expiration date. The maximum severance payment equals two years'

remuneration (including variable components), but no more than the amount of remuneration that would be payable until the end of the contract term.

Furthermore, in the event of early termination of employment on the Executive Board by mutual agreement, the company may also grant, or agree to grant, severance payments, the amount of which shall be limited, in turn, to a maximum of two years' remuneration and shall not compensate for more than the remaining term of the member's employment contract.

3. Non-Competition Clause

The Executive Board employment contracts provide for a post-contractual non-competition clause for a duration of up to two years upon termination of employment with the company. In the event that this non-competition clause is not waived or is nullified, half of the remuneration last paid by the company shall be granted to the respective Executive Board member as compensation for non-competition throughout the non-competition period. Any severance to be paid in connection with the termination of an employment contract to an Executive Board member shall be deducted in full from said compensation for non-competition in accordance with Recommendation G.13 of the GCGC dated December 16, 2019, provided that the employment contracts concerned have been extended after the GCGC had entered into force. This does not apply to Rainer Lehmann's employment contract, the term of which was extended at an earlier date and which does not currently contain a corresponding offsetting provision.

V. Procedure for Establishing and Implementing as well as Reviewing the Remuneration Policy

The Supervisory Board establishes and regularly reviews the remuneration policy for the Executive Board. The Executive Task Committee of the Supervisory Board prepares the remuneration policy for approval by the full Supervisory Board and makes the respective suggestions.

In the process, the Supervisory Board also reviews the appropriateness of such remuneration in comparison to the remuneration of the Executive Board within the peer group of the company (horizontal appropriateness). The peer group is defined by the Supervisory Board and/or its Executive Task Committee and is adapted as necessary. During the reporting year, the Supervisory Board conducted a benchmarking analysis of Executive Board remuneration with the assistance of a neutral external remuneration consultant and, in this context, reviewed and reconstituted the peer group. In determining the composition of the peer group, the Supervisory Board identified domestic and foreign companies that are comparable to the company in terms of industry, size, and sales. This updated peer group currently includes the following companies: Beiersdorf, Carl Zeiss Meditec, Drägerwerk, Gerresheimer, Qiagen, Symrise, SYNLAB, bioMérieux, Coloplast, Eurofins Scientific, Lonza Group, Smith&Nephew, Steris, and UCB.

In establishing the remuneration for the Executive Board members, the Supervisory Board further considers both the compensation of senior management and that of the remaining workforce in relation to the German Group companies (vertical appropriateness). For these purposes, the Supervisory Board defines senior management as the group of executives of the first two management levels below the Executive Board. The Supervisory Board looks not only at the current compensation ratio, but also at how it has developed over time.

If necessary, the Supervisory Board will engage an independent compensation consultant to review vertical and horizontal appropriateness; this was last carried out in the reporting year. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board also considers the requirements of the German Corporate Governance Code when determining and reviewing the remuneration of the Executive Board.

Any conflict of interest in the establishment, implementation and review of the remuneration policy shall be treated by the Supervisory Board in the same way as other conflicts of interest in the person of a Supervisory Board member. The Supervisory Board member concerned is therefore required to disclose any conflict of interest to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board and will not participate in the adoption of resolutions or in

the deliberations concerned. Disclosure of any conflicts of interest at an early stage ensures that the decisions of the Supervisory Board are not influenced by inappropriate considerations.

The current Executive Board members' employment contracts already complied with the new remuneration system in the reporting year, with only a few deviations as explained above. Insofar as discrepancies between the Executive Board employment contracts and the Executive Board remuneration policy still exist beyond the current year – this relates only to the partial payment for the consolidated net profit component of long-term variable remuneration and the lack of offsetting of the severance payment in the case of Rainer Lehmann – the Supervisory Board will examine, in consultation with the Executive Board member concerned, to what extent and, if applicable, from what period onwards an adjustment can be made. As long as such discrepancies continue to exist, they will be presented in the company's Remuneration Report.

VI. Compliance with the Maximum Remuneration Limits for the Executive Board

Executive Board remuneration is capped in two respects. Under the new remuneration policy, the total remuneration consisting of a fixed salary including fringe benefits, employee benefit expense, and the short-term and long-term variable remuneration components for a fiscal year – irrespective of whether it is paid in the fiscal year in question or at another time – is limited to a maximum gross amount of €4.5 million for the Executive Board Chairman and €2.25 million for each of the other Executive Board members. The maximum remuneration covers the maximum possible non-performance-related fixed and performance-related variable remuneration components, including employee benefit expense. Benefits in kind granted as fringe benefits are recognized at their value for income tax purposes. Regarding the share-based compensation of the Executive Board Chairman, this compensation paid as part of his maximum remuneration is calculated based on the pro-rated grant value attributable to one year.

For all current Executive Board members, the individual components of their remuneration are already structured so that the total remuneration granted to each respective Executive Board member for a fiscal year – regardless of whether it is paid in the fiscal year in question or at another time – does not exceed the maximum remuneration established in the new remuneration policy. For this purpose, a separate maximum amount is set for each of the variable remuneration components. This maximum amount is currently 120% of the target amount in the case of short-term variable compensation with a one-year assessment basis and 120% of the target amount in the case of the component of long-term variable compensation based on consolidated net profit, and 250% of the granted amount in the case of participation in the phantom stock program; for the purposes of calculating maximum remuneration, the Executive Board Chairman's share-based compensation is taken into account at the prorated grant value attributable to one year and thus at an amount fixed from the outset (see above).

The following table shows the maximum limits for the variable remuneration components and the shares granted. Compliance with the maximum limits for short-term variable remuneration and for the shares granted can be reviewed already for fiscal 2022. For multi-year variable remuneration, compliance with the maximum limits can only be reviewed retroactively as soon as these are vested or phantom stock units are exercised.

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg		Receipts	Dr. René Fáber		Receipts
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration		Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	
Short-term variable remuneration	600	720	442	300	360	169
Long-term variable remuneration						
Consolidated net result 2022 (3 years)	163	195	-	105	126	-
Reduction CO ₂ -emission intensity (3 years)	163	195	-	105	126	-
Phantom stock plan 2022 (exercisable from 2025)	325	813	-	210	525	-
Shares granted	1,000	1,000	1,000	-	-	-

€ in K	Rainer Lehmann		Receipts	John Gerard Mackay		Receipts
	Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration		Target remuneration	Maximum remuneration	
Short-term variable remuneration	288	345	212	300	360	288
Long-term variable remuneration						
Consolidated net result 2022 (3 years)	101	121	-	105	126	-
Reduction CO ₂ -emission intensity (3 years)	101	121	-	105	126	-
Phantom stock plan 2022 (exercisable from 2025)	201	503	-	210	525	-
Shares granted	-	-	-	-	-	-

The amount of the fixed remuneration components and the target and/or grant date amounts of the variable remuneration components for fiscal 2022 were selected for all Executive Board members so that even if the maximum amounts of the variable remuneration components are reached, the total gross amount of fixed and variable remuneration components of each Executive Board member will not exceed the highest sum defined by the maximum remuneration for this reporting year. The following table shows the maximum achievable amounts of the individual compensation components for 2022 and clearly shows that the maximum achievable compensation falls short of the defined maximum compensation of the Supervisory Board pursuant to Section 87a, Subsection 2, sentence 2, item no. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Law (AktG).

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	Dr. René Fáber	Rainer Lehmann	John Gerard Mackay
Fixed remuneration	1,000	480	460	480
Fringe benefits	15	13	124	50
Total non-performance-based remuneration	1,015	493	584	530
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)	720	360	345	360
Short-term variable remuneration	720	360	345	360
Consolidated net result (3 years)	195	126	121	126
Reduction CO ₂ -emission intensity (3 years)	195	126	121	126
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years)	813	525	503	525
Long-term variable remuneration	1,203	777	745	777
Shares granted	1,000	0	0	0
Other remuneration component	0	0	0	0
Post-employment benefits	367	247	96	67
Maximum achievable remuneration	4,304	1,877	1,770	1,734
Maximum remuneration in accordance with Section 87a para. 1 sent. 2 No. 1 of the German Stock Corporation Act	4,500	2,250	2,250	2,250

The final review of compliance with the maximum remuneration for fiscal 2022 will be presented in the remuneration report for the fiscal year in which the last long-term remuneration component was vested and/or exercised. As Sartorius did not have any comparable policy for maximum remuneration in the past, no disclosures on compliance with maximum remuneration can be provided for an earlier business year.

2. Remuneration of the Executive Board Members in the Reporting Year

Total remuneration granted and owed for the active service of all Executive Board members together amounted to €5,901K in 2022, compared with €5,750K in the previous year. The details of the individual remuneration components are described in the following.

Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Executive Board Pursuant to Section 162 of AktG

The following table shows the remuneration granted and owed to the Executive Board pursuant to Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). Remuneration is deemed to be owed if it is due but has not yet been paid. In this case, remuneration granted is assumed already at the time service is performed and not only at the point in time of payment. The figures stated for variable remuneration components are the amounts "vested" in the respective fiscal year.

€ in K	Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg				Dr. René Fáber			
	2022	in %	2021	in %	2022	in %	2021	in %
Fixed remuneration	1,000	44%	1,000	39%	480	45%	440	49%
Fringe benefits ¹	15	1%	15	1%	13	1%	13	1%
Fixed remuneration	1,015	44%	1,015	39%	493	47%	453	51%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)²	442	19%	720	28%	169	16%	264	30%
Consolidated net profit (3 years) ³	278	12%	266	10%	130	12%	128	14%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ⁴	555	24%	539	21%	266	25%	0	0%
Components with a long-term incentive effect	833	36%	805	31%	396	37%	128	14%
Other remuneration component	0	0%	45	2%	0	0%	45	5%
Defined contribution plans ⁵	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Total remuneration	2,290	100%	2,585	100%	1,058	100%	890	100%

€ in K	Rainer Lehmann				John Gerard Mackay			
	2022	in %	2021	in %	2022	in %	2021	in %
Fixed remuneration	460	36%	440	34%	480	37%	440	44%
Fringe benefits ¹	124	10%	83	6%	50	4%	29	3%
Fixed remuneration	584	46%	523	41%	530	41%	469	47%
Variable performance-based remuneration (1 year)²	212	17%	330	26%	288	22%	264	27%
Consolidated net profit (3 years) ³	210	17%	128	10%	130	10%	128	13%
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ⁴	266	21%	259	20%	266	21%	0	0%
Components with a long-term incentive effect	476	37%	387	30%	396	31%	128	13%
Other remuneration component	0	0%	45	4%	0	0%	45	5%
Defined contribution plans ⁵	0	0%	0	0%	67	5%	84	8%
Total remuneration	1,272	100%	1,285	100%	1,281	100%	990	100%

1 The amounts contributed to D&O insurance totaling €871K (2021: €470K) are not included, as these refer to the executive bodies of all companies of the Sartorius Group and are not allocated to the individual insureds.

2 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement.

3 Recognized amount corresponds to actual target achievement of the plan in which a fiscal year ended; i.e., for 2022, consolidated net profits for 2020 - 2022 (2021: consolidated net profits for 2019 - 2021).

4 Fair value at the time granted.

5 Payments for a pension plan.

As part of the remuneration component based on the consolidated net profit of three consecutive fiscal years, each Executive Board member receives a partial compensation payment of 50% of their respective target achievement for the first fiscal year under review. Once the total target achievement has been determined after the third fiscal year, final payment is then effected by deducting the particular partial payment already made. The amounts of the partial payments made in total at the end of the reporting year are shown as follows:

€ in K	2022	2021
Balance as of Jan. 1 of a fiscal year	607	470
Partial payments deducted	-280	-190
Partial payments effected	442	327
Balance as of Dec. 31 of a fiscal year	769	607

Remuneration Granted and Owed to Former Executive Board Members

€ in K	Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)		Other	
	2022	2021	2022	2021
Phantom stock plan (4-8 years) ¹	188	336	0	0
Annuity	0	0	526	517
Total remuneration	188	336	526	517

¹ Fair value at the time granted.

3. Disclosures on Share-Based Payments | Phantom Stock Units

	Number of phantom stock units	Price on assignment in €	Fair value when granted on Jan. 1 of the particular year € in K	Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2021 € in K	Fair value at year-end on Dec. 31, 2022 € in K	Paid in fiscal 2022 € in K	Change in value in fiscal 2022 € in K	Status
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg								
Tranche for fiscal 2018	2,685	80.32	216	539	0	539	0	Paid out in 2022
Tranche for fiscal 2019	1,950	113.78	222	555	555	0	0	Exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	1,240	190.30	236	590	455	0	-135	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2021	918	354.13	325	500	315	0	-185	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	6,793		999	2,184	1,325	539	-320	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	566	574.61	325	0	179	0	-146	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	7,359		1,324	2,184	1,504	539	-466	
Dr. René Fäber								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	275	212	0	-63	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	169	106	0	-63	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	1,823		326	710	584	0	-126	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	365	574.61	210	0	116	0	-94	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	2,188		536	710	700	0	-220	
Rainer Lehmann								
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,289	80.32	104	259	0	259	0	Paid out in 2022
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	936	190.30	178	445	344	0	-101	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2021	544	354.13	193	297	186	0	-111	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	3,703		581	1,267	796	259	-212	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	350	574.61	201	0	111	0	-90	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	4,053		782	1,267	907	259	-302	
John Gerard Mackay								
Tranche for fiscal 2019	934	113.78	106	266	266	0	0	Exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2020	578	190.30	110	275	212	0	-63	Not exercisable
Tranche for fiscal 2021	311	354.13	110	169	106	0	-63	Not exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	1,823		326	710	584	0	-126	
Tranche for fiscal 2022	365	574.61	210	0	116	0	-94	Not exercisable
Total sum of tranches	2,188		536	710	700	0	-220	
Reinhard Vogt (until Dec. 31, 2018)								
Tranche for fiscal 2018	1,673	80.32	134	336	0	336	0	Paid out in 2022
Tranche for fiscal 2019	661	113.78	75	188	188	0	0	Exercisable
Sum of the tranches from the previous years	2,334		209	524	188	336	0	

4. Pension Commitments

The projected pension payments, the present value of pension obligations and service cost are shown in the following table:

€ in K	Projected pension payment p.a.	Present value of the obligation (IFRS)		Service cost (IFRS)	
		Dec. 31, 2022	Dec. 31, 2021	2022	2021
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	283	3,959	4,941	113	177
Dr. René Fáber	44	236	0	0	0
Rainer Lehmann	89	523	391	0	0
	416	4,718	5,332	113	177

In addition, a pension contribution of €189 K (2021: €138 K) was recognized in 2022 for Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg, a pension contribution of €247 K (2021: €0 K) for Dr. René Fáber, and a pension contribution of €96 K (2021: €91 K) for Rainer Lehmann. The pension contribution for Dr. René Fáber includes a lump-sum payment with an amount of €180 K.

5. Comparative Table

€ in K	2022	Change in %	2021	in %	2020
Managing Board Members					
Dr. Joachim Kreuzburg	2,290	-11%	2,585	17%	2,202
Dr. René Fáber	1,058	19%	890	25%	714
Rainer Lehmann	1,272	-1%	1,285	13%	1,138
John Gerard Mackay	1,281	29%	990	27%	777
Former Managing Board Members					
Reinhard Vogt	188	-44%	336	-73%	1,246
Other	526	2%	517	3%	501
Earnings Development					
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,410	20%	1,175	70%	692
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	155	277%	41	-64%	113
Average Remuneration of Employees					
Group employees in Germany only	85	-4%	89	1%	88

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. In addition to wages and salaries, average remuneration also includes social security contributions and pension expenses. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

6. Main Features of the Remuneration Plan for the Supervisory Board

The remuneration for Supervisory Board members is defined in the Articles of Association of Sartorius AG and comprises fixed remuneration, meeting attendance fees, and reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses. Members serving as chairperson and vice chairperson of the Supervisory Board receive higher fixed remuneration.

Members and chairpersons of Supervisory Board committees, except for those of Nomination Committee or the committee pursuant to Section 27, Subsection 3, of the German Codetermination Law (MitBestG), are entitled to receive additional annual fixed amounts and meeting attendance fees as well as reimbursement of their out-of-pocket expenses.

In addition, the members of the Supervisory Board are included in a directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance policy taken out by the company, the premiums for which are paid by Sartorius Aktiengesellschaft. This D&O insurance policy covers the legal liability arising from Supervisory Board activities and is taken out at standard market terms and conditions.

In line with prevailing market practice at listed companies in Germany, the remuneration of Supervisory Board members is strictly fixed compensation along with meeting attendance fees and does not include any performance-related components. The Executive Board and Supervisory Board are of the opinion that strictly fixed remuneration for Supervisory Board members is best suited to strengthening the independence of the Supervisory Board and fulfilling the latter's advisory and supervisory functions, which are to be performed independently of the company's success. The amount and structure of Supervisory Board remuneration ensure that the company is able to attract qualified candidates for membership in the company's Supervisory Board; in this way, Supervisory Board remuneration helps sustainably promote the business strategy and the long-term development of the company. The existing remuneration policy especially takes into account Recommendation G.17 and the Suggestion G.18, sentence 1, of the German Corporate Governance Code in the current version as amended.

7. Remuneration Granted and Owed to the Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2022	2021
Remuneration for the Supervisory Board Members		
Total remuneration	1,017	1,057
Fixed remuneration	675	675
Compensation for committee work	120	121
Meeting attendance fee	154	192
Total remuneration for the Sartorius Stedim Biotech subgroup	68	69
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	68	69

€ in K	2022	2021
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)		
Total remuneration	256	261
Fixed remuneration	135	135
Compensation for committee work	33	33
Meeting attendance fee	20	24
Remuneration from Sartorius Stedim Biotech S.A., Aubagne	68	69

€ in K	2022	2021
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman) ¹		
Total remuneration	134	137
Fixed remuneration	90	90
Compensation for committee work	24	24
Meeting attendance fee	20	23

€ in K	2022	2021
Annette Becker ¹		
Total remuneration	68	70
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	9	8
Meeting attendance fee	14	17

€ in K	2022	2021
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.		
Total remuneration	54	57
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	9	12

€ in K	2022	2021
Dr. Daniela Favocchia		
Total remuneration	54	57
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	9	12

€ in K	2022	2021
Petra Kirchhoff		
Total remuneration	54	57
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	9	12
€ in K	2022	2021
Dietmar Müller¹		
Total remuneration	75	75
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	15	13
Meeting attendance fee	15	17
€ in K	2022	2021
Ilke Hildegard Panzer		
Total remuneration	54	57
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Meeting attendance fee	9	12
€ in K	2022	2021
Frank Riemensperger (as of Mar. 25, 2022)		
Total remuneration	43	0
Fixed remuneration	35	0
Meeting attendance fee	8	0
€ in K	2022	2021
Hermann Jens Ritzau (as of Mar. 1, 2021)¹		
Total remuneration	54	49
Fixed remuneration	45	38
Meeting attendance fee	9	11
€ in K	2022	2021
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher		
Total remuneration	104	108
Fixed remuneration	45	45
Compensation for committee work	39	39
Meeting attendance fee	20	24
€ in K	2022	2021
Sabrina Wirth (as of Mar. 25, 2022)¹		
Total remuneration	43	0
Fixed remuneration	35	0
Meeting attendance fee	8	0

Former Supervisory Board Members

€ in K	2022	2021
Uwe Bretthauer (until Feb. 28, 2021) ¹		
Total remuneration	0	16
Fixed remuneration	0	7
Compensation for committee work	0	4
Meeting attendance fee	0	5

€ in K	2022	2021
Karoline Kleinschmidt (until Mar. 25, 2022) ¹		
Total remuneration	12	57
Fixed remuneration	10	45
Meeting attendance fee	2	12

€ in K	2022	2021
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheper (until Mar. 25, 2022)		
Total remuneration	12	56
Fixed remuneration	10	45
Meeting attendance fee	2	11

¹ The employee representatives declared that they donate their Supervisory Board remuneration to the foundation Hans-Böckler-Stiftung according to the guidelines of the German Trade Union Association.

Beyond their Supervisory Board remuneration, the employee representatives who are employees within the Sartorius Group receive compensation that is not related to their service on the Supervisory Board.

8. Comparative Table

€ in K	2022	Change in %	2021	in %	2020
Supervisory Board Members					
Dr. Lothar Kappich (Chairman)	256	-2%	261	0%	262
Manfred Zaffke (Vice Chairman)	134	-2%	137	-2%	140
Annette Becker	68	-3%	70	30%	54
Prof. David Raymond Ebsworth, Ph.D.	54	-5%	57	2%	56
Dr. Daniela Favocchia	54	-5%	57	2%	56
Petra Kirchhoff	54	-5%	57	2%	56
Dietmar Müller	75	0%	75	142%	31
Ilke Hildegard Panzer	54	-5%	57	2%	56
Frank Riemensperger (as of Mar. 25, 2022)	43		0		0
Hermann Jens Ritzau (as of Mar. 1, 2021)	54	10%	49		0
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rüdiger Trützscher	104	-4%	108	0%	108
Sabrina Wirth (as of Mar. 25, 2022)	43		0		0
Former Supervisory Board Members					
Karoline Kleinschmidt (until Mar. 25, 2022)	12	-79%	57	2%	56
Prof. Dr. Thomas Scheper (until Mar. 25, 2022)	12	-79%	56	0%	56
Uwe Bretthauer (until Feb. 28, 2021)	0	-100%	16	-83%	95
Earnings Development					
Underlying EBITDA in millions of €	1,410	20%	1,175	70%	692
Net profit of Sartorius AG in millions of €	155	277%	41	-64%	113
Average Remuneration of Employees					
Group employees in Germany only	85	-4%	89	1%	88

In the presentation of the average remuneration of employees, all people employed by the German companies of the Sartorius Group (except for the Executive Board members) were included. In addition to wages and salaries, average remuneration also includes social security contributions and pension expenses. If employees simultaneously receive remuneration as members of the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, this compensation was not considered. Remuneration of part-time employees was extrapolated to full-time equivalents.

9. Requirements pursuant to Section 162, Subsection 1, Sentence 2, No. 6 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG)

The Annual General Meeting approved the Remuneration Report for fiscal 2021 at the Annual General Meeting on March 25, 2022 with 99.56% of the votes cast.

Report of the Independent Auditor

NOTE ON THE AUDIT OF THE REMUNERATION REPORT

We have audited the attached Remuneration Report of Sartorius AG, Göttingen, Germany, for the fiscal year from January 1 to December 31, 2022, including the related disclosures, which was prepared to comply with Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Law (AktG).

Responsibility of the Legal Representatives and the Supervisory Board

The legal representatives and the Supervisory Board of Sartorius AG, Göttingen, are responsible for the preparation of the Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures, which complies with the requirements of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). In addition, the legal representatives and the Supervisory Board are responsible for such internal control as they consider necessary to enable the preparation of a Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures, that is free from material misstatements, whether due to fraud or error.

Auditor's Responsibility

Our responsibility is to express an opinion on this Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures, based on our audit. We conducted our audit in accordance with German Generally Accepted Standards for Financial Statement Audits promulgated by the Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer [Institute of Public Auditors in Germany] (IDW). Those standards require that we comply with ethical requirements and plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures, is free from material misstatements.

An audit involves performing procedures to obtain audit evidence about the amounts and disclosures in the Remuneration Report. The selection of audit procedures is at the discretion of the auditor. This includes assessing the risks of material misstatement – whether due to fraud or error – in the Remuneration Report, including in relation to the accompanying disclosures. When evaluating those risks, the auditor considers the internal control system relevant to the preparation of the Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures. The objective of this is to plan and perform audit procedures that are appropriate under the circumstances, but not for the purpose of expressing an opinion on the effectiveness of the company's internal control system. Such an audit also includes an assessment of the accounting policies used and whether the accounting estimates made by the legal representatives and the Supervisory Board are reasonable, as well as evaluating the overall presentation of the Remuneration Report, including the related disclosures.

In our opinion, we obtained sufficient and appropriate evidence to provide a basis for our audit opinion.

Opinion

In our opinion, based on the findings of our audit, the Remuneration Report for the fiscal year from January 1 to December 31, 2022, including the related disclosures, complies in all material respects with the accounting provisions of Section 162 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

Other Matters – Formal Audit of the Remuneration Report

The substantive review of the Remuneration Report described in this Auditor's Report comprises the formal review of the Remuneration Report required by Section 1623 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), including the issuance of an opinion on such review. As we expressed an unqualified opinion on the content of the Remuneration Report, this opinion includes the conclusion that the required disclosures pursuant to Section 162(1) and (2) of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG) have, in all material respects, been included in the Remuneration Report.

Note on Limitation of Liability

The engagement, in the performance of which we rendered the aforementioned services for Sartorius AG, Göttingen, Germany, was based on the General Terms and Conditions of Engagement for Auditors and Auditing Firms in the version dated January 1, 2017. By acknowledging and using the information contained in this Auditor's Report, each recipient confirms that it has taken note of the provisions contained therein (including the limitation of liability to 4 million euros for negligence in Section 9 of the General Engagement Terms) and acknowledges their validity in relation to us.

Hanover, February 10, 2023

KPMG AG
Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft

Schmidt

German Public Auditor

Hartke

German Public Auditor